From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> To: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>, Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>, "H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, libc-alpha@sourceware.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] arm64: Enable BTI for main executable as well as the interpreter Date: Thu, 3 Jun 2021 17:51:34 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210603165134.GF4257@sirena.org.uk> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210603154034.GH4187@arm.com> [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1017 bytes --] On Thu, Jun 03, 2021 at 04:40:35PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote: > Do we know how libcs will detect that they don't need to do the > mprotect() calls? Do we need a detection mechanism at all? > Ignoring certain errors from mprotect() when ld.so is trying to set > PROT_BTI on the main executable's code pages is probably a reasonable, > backwards-compatible compromise here, but it seems a bit wasteful. I think the theory was that they would just do the mprotect() calls and ignore any errors as they currently do, or declare that they depend on a new enough kernel version I guess (not an option for glibc but might be for others which didn't do BTI yet). > > flexibility userspace has to disable BTI but it is expected that for cases > > where there are problems which require BTI to be disabled it is more likely > > that it will need to be disabled on a system level. > There's no flexibility impact unless MemoryDenyWriteExecute is in force, > right? Right, or some other mechanism that has the same effect. [-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --] [-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 488 bytes --]
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> To: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>, Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>, "H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, libc-alpha@sourceware.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] arm64: Enable BTI for main executable as well as the interpreter Date: Thu, 3 Jun 2021 17:51:34 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210603165134.GF4257@sirena.org.uk> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210603154034.GH4187@arm.com> [-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1017 bytes --] On Thu, Jun 03, 2021 at 04:40:35PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote: > Do we know how libcs will detect that they don't need to do the > mprotect() calls? Do we need a detection mechanism at all? > Ignoring certain errors from mprotect() when ld.so is trying to set > PROT_BTI on the main executable's code pages is probably a reasonable, > backwards-compatible compromise here, but it seems a bit wasteful. I think the theory was that they would just do the mprotect() calls and ignore any errors as they currently do, or declare that they depend on a new enough kernel version I guess (not an option for glibc but might be for others which didn't do BTI yet). > > flexibility userspace has to disable BTI but it is expected that for cases > > where there are problems which require BTI to be disabled it is more likely > > that it will need to be disabled on a system level. > There's no flexibility impact unless MemoryDenyWriteExecute is in force, > right? Right, or some other mechanism that has the same effect. [-- Attachment #1.2: signature.asc --] [-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 488 bytes --] [-- Attachment #2: Type: text/plain, Size: 176 bytes --] _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-03 16:51 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-05-21 14:46 [PATCH v1 0/2] arm64: Enable BTI for the executable as well as the interpreter Mark Brown 2021-05-21 14:46 ` Mark Brown 2021-05-21 14:46 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] elf: Allow architectures to parse properties on the main executable Mark Brown 2021-05-21 14:46 ` Mark Brown 2021-06-03 15:40 ` Dave Martin 2021-06-03 15:40 ` Dave Martin 2021-06-03 18:52 ` Mark Brown 2021-06-03 18:52 ` Mark Brown 2021-05-21 14:46 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] arm64: Enable BTI for main executable as well as the interpreter Mark Brown 2021-05-21 14:46 ` Mark Brown 2021-06-03 15:40 ` Dave Martin 2021-06-03 15:40 ` Dave Martin 2021-06-03 16:51 ` Mark Brown [this message] 2021-06-03 16:51 ` Mark Brown 2021-06-03 18:04 ` Catalin Marinas 2021-06-03 18:04 ` Catalin Marinas 2021-06-07 11:25 ` Dave Martin 2021-06-07 11:25 ` Dave Martin 2021-06-07 18:12 ` Catalin Marinas 2021-06-07 18:12 ` Catalin Marinas 2021-06-08 11:33 ` Mark Brown 2021-06-08 11:33 ` Mark Brown 2021-06-08 15:19 ` Dave Martin 2021-06-08 15:19 ` Dave Martin 2021-06-08 15:42 ` Jeremy Linton 2021-06-08 15:42 ` Jeremy Linton 2021-06-10 10:33 ` Dave Martin 2021-06-10 10:33 ` Dave Martin
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