From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EF44AC48BDF for ; Sun, 13 Jun 2021 11:42:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D80D2611B0 for ; Sun, 13 Jun 2021 11:42:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231738AbhFMLoG (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Jun 2021 07:44:06 -0400 Received: from wforward1-smtp.messagingengine.com ([64.147.123.30]:58989 "EHLO wforward1-smtp.messagingengine.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231736AbhFMLoF (ORCPT ); Sun, 13 Jun 2021 07:44:05 -0400 Received: from compute1.internal (compute1.nyi.internal [10.202.2.41]) by mailforward.west.internal (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9310B11FA; Sun, 13 Jun 2021 07:42:04 -0400 (EDT) Received: from mailfrontend2 ([10.202.2.163]) by compute1.internal (MEProxy); Sun, 13 Jun 2021 07:42:04 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d= messagingengine.com; h=cc:content-transfer-encoding:content-type :date:from:message-id:mime-version:subject:to:x-me-proxy :x-me-proxy:x-me-sender:x-me-sender:x-sasl-enc; s=fm3; bh=SrCeTP uZFUB4pbmpVGJlsO3/nkSXPcI3Z6DCtzlIfss=; b=NmWRyVJQQTEzSX8a481/DE eQvSpC3Dd32sFAGVh+je+UFFoj0gXzK5TtndKngFsfP4/cv6LSUcpNsIXptXzyoi xrdNPniO/78DEMdt1knXBwNaJg1sIBDrV7J4JRcpSurPtItZHMde0KObmtJFu35T cniCK9UM0GXQ8h89yODorCWyZToNLbIGbCk8c1XE6/KJNjsRxvh05d3T/fnv/uXV KYUVDz2k/etMLE9s/5CTDuFo0Wgn6nRphwZtwmBxvJTXv2sn91burIvLbHvgTatU 1yxS5nDS8Ak1iBe1eOWvrLhUJDeC9TfT5I0JU/BtaR2dO2ShgnpQnRJxZGR2NKLA == X-ME-Sender: X-ME-Received: X-ME-Proxy-Cause: gggruggvucftvghtrhhoucdtuddrgeduledrfedvfedggeehucetufdoteggodetrfdotf fvucfrrhhofhhilhgvmecuhfgrshhtofgrihhlpdfqfgfvpdfurfetoffkrfgpnffqhgen uceurghilhhouhhtmecufedttdenucenucfjughrpefuvffhfffkgggtgfesthekredttd dtlfenucfhrhhomhepoehgrhgvghhkhheslhhinhhugihfohhunhgurghtihhonhdrohhr gheqnecuggftrfgrthhtvghrnhepleelledvgeefleeltdetgedugeffgffhudffudduke egfeelgeeigeekjefhleevnecuffhomhgrihhnpehkvghrnhgvlhdrohhrghenucevlhhu shhtvghrufhiiigvpedtnecurfgrrhgrmhepmhgrihhlfhhrohhmpehgrhgvgheskhhroh grhhdrtghomh X-ME-Proxy: Received: by mail.messagingengine.com (Postfix) with ESMTPA; Sun, 13 Jun 2021 07:42:03 -0400 (EDT) Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: X86: MMU: Use the correct inherited permissions to get" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree To: laijs@linux.alibaba.com, pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: From: Date: Sun, 13 Jun 2021 13:41:56 +0200 Message-ID: <1623584516705@kroah.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to . thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From b1bd5cba3306691c771d558e94baa73e8b0b96b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lai Jiangshan Date: Thu, 3 Jun 2021 13:24:55 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: X86: MMU: Use the correct inherited permissions to get shadow page When computing the access permissions of a shadow page, use the effective permissions of the walk up to that point, i.e. the logic AND of its parents' permissions. Two guest PxE entries that point at the same table gfn need to be shadowed with different shadow pages if their parents' permissions are different. KVM currently uses the effective permissions of the last non-leaf entry for all non-leaf entries. Because all non-leaf SPTEs have full ("uwx") permissions, and the effective permissions are recorded only in role.access and merged into the leaves, this can lead to incorrect reuse of a shadow page and eventually to a missing guest protection page fault. For example, here is a shared pagetable: pgd[] pud[] pmd[] virtual address pointers /->pmd1(u--)->pte1(uw-)->page1 <- ptr1 (u--) /->pud1(uw-)--->pmd2(uw-)->pte2(uw-)->page2 <- ptr2 (uw-) pgd-| (shared pmd[] as above) \->pud2(u--)--->pmd1(u--)->pte1(uw-)->page1 <- ptr3 (u--) \->pmd2(uw-)->pte2(uw-)->page2 <- ptr4 (u--) pud1 and pud2 point to the same pmd table, so: - ptr1 and ptr3 points to the same page. - ptr2 and ptr4 points to the same page. (pud1 and pud2 here are pud entries, while pmd1 and pmd2 here are pmd entries) - First, the guest reads from ptr1 first and KVM prepares a shadow page table with role.access=u--, from ptr1's pud1 and ptr1's pmd1. "u--" comes from the effective permissions of pgd, pud1 and pmd1, which are stored in pt->access. "u--" is used also to get the pagetable for pud1, instead of "uw-". - Then the guest writes to ptr2 and KVM reuses pud1 which is present. The hypervisor set up a shadow page for ptr2 with pt->access is "uw-" even though the pud1 pmd (because of the incorrect argument to kvm_mmu_get_page in the previous step) has role.access="u--". - Then the guest reads from ptr3. The hypervisor reuses pud1's shadow pmd for pud2, because both use "u--" for their permissions. Thus, the shadow pmd already includes entries for both pmd1 and pmd2. - At last, the guest writes to ptr4. This causes no vmexit or pagefault, because pud1's shadow page structures included an "uw-" page even though its role.access was "u--". Any kind of shared pagetable might have the similar problem when in virtual machine without TDP enabled if the permissions are different from different ancestors. In order to fix the problem, we change pt->access to be an array, and any access in it will not include permissions ANDed from child ptes. The test code is: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20210603050537.19605-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com/ Remember to test it with TDP disabled. The problem had existed long before the commit 41074d07c78b ("KVM: MMU: Fix inherited permissions for emulated guest pte updates"), and it is hard to find which is the culprit. So there is no fixes tag here. Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan Message-Id: <20210603052455.21023-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: cea0f0e7ea54 ("[PATCH] KVM: MMU: Shadow page table caching") Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/mmu.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/mmu.rst index 5bfe28b0728e..20d85daed395 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/mmu.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/mmu.rst @@ -171,8 +171,8 @@ Shadow pages contain the following information: shadow pages) so role.quadrant takes values in the range 0..3. Each quadrant maps 1GB virtual address space. role.access: - Inherited guest access permissions in the form uwx. Note execute - permission is positive, not negative. + Inherited guest access permissions from the parent ptes in the form uwx. + Note execute permission is positive, not negative. role.invalid: The page is invalid and should not be used. It is a root page that is currently pinned (by a cpu hardware register pointing to it); once it is diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h index 70b7e44e3035..823a5919f9fa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h @@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ struct guest_walker { gpa_t pte_gpa[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; pt_element_t __user *ptep_user[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; bool pte_writable[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; - unsigned pt_access; - unsigned pte_access; + unsigned int pt_access[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; + unsigned int pte_access; gfn_t gfn; struct x86_exception fault; }; @@ -418,13 +418,15 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker, } walker->ptes[walker->level - 1] = pte; + + /* Convert to ACC_*_MASK flags for struct guest_walker. */ + walker->pt_access[walker->level - 1] = FNAME(gpte_access)(pt_access ^ walk_nx_mask); } while (!is_last_gpte(mmu, walker->level, pte)); pte_pkey = FNAME(gpte_pkeys)(vcpu, pte); accessed_dirty = have_ad ? pte_access & PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK : 0; /* Convert to ACC_*_MASK flags for struct guest_walker. */ - walker->pt_access = FNAME(gpte_access)(pt_access ^ walk_nx_mask); walker->pte_access = FNAME(gpte_access)(pte_access ^ walk_nx_mask); errcode = permission_fault(vcpu, mmu, walker->pte_access, pte_pkey, access); if (unlikely(errcode)) @@ -463,7 +465,8 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker, } pgprintk("%s: pte %llx pte_access %x pt_access %x\n", - __func__, (u64)pte, walker->pte_access, walker->pt_access); + __func__, (u64)pte, walker->pte_access, + walker->pt_access[walker->level - 1]); return 1; error: @@ -643,7 +646,7 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, bool huge_page_disallowed = exec && nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled; struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = NULL; struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator it; - unsigned direct_access, access = gw->pt_access; + unsigned int direct_access, access; int top_level, level, req_level, ret; gfn_t base_gfn = gw->gfn; @@ -675,6 +678,7 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, sp = NULL; if (!is_shadow_present_pte(*it.sptep)) { table_gfn = gw->table_gfn[it.level - 2]; + access = gw->pt_access[it.level - 2]; sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, table_gfn, addr, it.level-1, false, access); }