From: James Carter <jwcart2@gmail.com>
To: cgzones@googlemail.com
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] libsepol: validate class permissions
Date: Thu, 2 May 2024 14:04:41 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAP+JOzTNyOgax=CNarNOt=7BO-C9gZ-BzJy8nhE0Y7HHhUk9Rw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAP+JOzRHdYJZDdPKGFKHrEhGih8V2g=fydfDA_ai3W95VZEAdQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 2:48 PM James Carter <jwcart2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 12:53 PM Christian Göttsche
> <cgoettsche@seltendoof.de> wrote:
> >
> > From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
> >
> > Validate the symbol tables for permissions of security classes and
> > common classes:
> > * check their value is valid
> > * check their values are unique
> > * check permission values of classes do not reuse values from
> > inherited permissions
> >
> > This simplifies validating permissions of access vectors a lot, since it
> > is now only a binary and against the valid permission mask of the class.
> >
> > Use UINT32_MAX instead of 0 as the special value for validating
> > constraints signaling a validate-trans rule, since classes with no
> > permissions are permitted, but they must not have a normal constraint
> > attached.
> >
> > Reported-by: oss-fuzz (issue 67893)
> > Improves: 8c64e5bb6fe7 ("libsepol: validate access vector permissions")
> > Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
> > ---
> > v2:
> > - move check independent of individual constraints out of the loop
> > - change nperms parameter type of validate_constraint_nodes() from
> > unsigned int to uint32_t
> > Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
>
> Acked-by: James Carter <jwcart2@gmail.com>
>
Merged.
Thanks,
Jim
> > ---
> > libsepol/src/policydb_validate.c | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> > 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/libsepol/src/policydb_validate.c b/libsepol/src/policydb_validate.c
> > index c4f8c300..e1623172 100644
> > --- a/libsepol/src/policydb_validate.c
> > +++ b/libsepol/src/policydb_validate.c
> > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
> >
> > #define bool_xor(a, b) (!(a) != !(b))
> > #define bool_xnor(a, b) (!bool_xor(a, b))
> > +#define PERMISSION_MASK(nprim) ((nprim) == PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE ? (~UINT32_C(0)) : ((UINT32_C(1) << (nprim)) - 1))
> >
> > typedef struct validate {
> > uint32_t nprim;
> > @@ -23,6 +24,12 @@ typedef struct map_arg {
> > const policydb_t *policy;
> > } map_arg_t;
> >
> > +typedef struct perm_arg {
> > + uint32_t visited;
> > + const uint32_t nprim;
> > + const uint32_t inherited_nprim;
> > +} perm_arg_t;
> > +
> > static int create_gap_ebitmap(char **val_to_name, uint32_t nprim, ebitmap_t *gaps)
> > {
> > uint32_t i;
> > @@ -227,17 +234,21 @@ bad:
> > return -1;
> > }
> >
> > -static int validate_constraint_nodes(sepol_handle_t *handle, unsigned int nperms, const constraint_node_t *cons, validate_t flavors[])
> > +static int validate_constraint_nodes(sepol_handle_t *handle, uint32_t nperms, const constraint_node_t *cons, validate_t flavors[])
> > {
> > const constraint_expr_t *cexp;
> > + const int is_validatetrans = (nperms == UINT32_MAX);
> > int depth;
> >
> > + if (cons && nperms == 0)
> > + goto bad;
> > +
> > for (; cons; cons = cons->next) {
> > - if (nperms == 0 && cons->permissions != 0)
> > + if (is_validatetrans && cons->permissions != 0)
> > goto bad;
> > - if (nperms > 0 && cons->permissions == 0)
> > + if (!is_validatetrans && cons->permissions == 0)
> > goto bad;
> > - if (nperms > 0 && nperms != PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE && cons->permissions >= (UINT32_C(1) << nperms))
> > + if (!is_validatetrans && nperms != PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE && cons->permissions >= (UINT32_C(1) << nperms))
> > goto bad;
> >
> > if (!cons->expr)
> > @@ -251,7 +262,7 @@ static int validate_constraint_nodes(sepol_handle_t *handle, unsigned int nperms
> > goto bad;
> > depth++;
> >
> > - if (cexp->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET && nperms != 0)
> > + if (cexp->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET && !is_validatetrans)
> > goto bad;
> > if (!(cexp->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)) {
> > if (validate_empty_type_set(cexp->type_names))
> > @@ -366,11 +377,49 @@ bad:
> > return -1;
> > }
> >
> > +static int perm_visit(__attribute__((__unused__)) hashtab_key_t k, hashtab_datum_t d, void *args)
> > +{
> > + perm_arg_t *pargs = args;
> > + const perm_datum_t *perdatum = d;
> > +
> > + if (!value_isvalid(perdatum->s.value, pargs->nprim))
> > + return -1;
> > +
> > + if (pargs->inherited_nprim != 0 && value_isvalid(perdatum->s.value, pargs->inherited_nprim))
> > + return -1;
> > +
> > + if ((UINT32_C(1) << (perdatum->s.value - 1)) & pargs->visited)
> > + return -1;
> > +
> > + pargs->visited |= (UINT32_C(1) << (perdatum->s.value - 1));
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int validate_permission_symtab(sepol_handle_t *handle, const symtab_t *permissions, uint32_t inherited_nprim)
> > +{
> > + /* Check each entry has a different valid value and is not overriding an inherited one */
> > +
> > + perm_arg_t pargs = { .visited = 0, .nprim = permissions->nprim, .inherited_nprim = inherited_nprim };
> > +
> > + if (hashtab_map(permissions->table, perm_visit, &pargs))
> > + goto bad;
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > +bad:
> > + ERR(handle, "Invalid permission table");
> > + return -1;
> > +}
> > +
> > static int validate_common_datum(sepol_handle_t *handle, const common_datum_t *common, validate_t flavors[])
> > {
> > if (validate_value(common->s.value, &flavors[SYM_COMMONS]))
> > goto bad;
> > - if (common->permissions.table->nel == 0 || common->permissions.nprim > PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE)
> > + if (common->permissions.nprim == 0 || common->permissions.nprim > PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE)
> > + goto bad;
> > + if (common->permissions.nprim != common->permissions.table->nel)
> > + goto bad;
> > + if (validate_permission_symtab(handle, &common->permissions, 0))
> > goto bad;
> >
> > return 0;
> > @@ -393,11 +442,17 @@ static int validate_class_datum(sepol_handle_t *handle, const class_datum_t *cla
> > goto bad;
> > if (class->comdatum && validate_common_datum(handle, class->comdatum, flavors))
> > goto bad;
> > - if (class->permissions.nprim > PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE)
> > + /* empty classes are permitted */
> > + if (class->permissions.nprim > PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE || class->permissions.table->nel > PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE)
> > + goto bad;
> > + if (class->permissions.nprim !=
> > + (class->permissions.table->nel + (class->comdatum ? class->comdatum->permissions.table->nel : 0)))
> > + goto bad;
> > + if (validate_permission_symtab(handle, &class->permissions, class->comdatum ? class->comdatum->permissions.nprim : 0))
> > goto bad;
> > if (validate_constraint_nodes(handle, class->permissions.nprim, class->constraints, flavors))
> > goto bad;
> > - if (validate_constraint_nodes(handle, 0, class->validatetrans, flavors))
> > + if (validate_constraint_nodes(handle, UINT32_MAX, class->validatetrans, flavors))
> > goto bad;
> >
> > switch (class->default_user) {
> > @@ -877,46 +932,23 @@ bad:
> > return -1;
> > }
> >
> > -static int perm_match(__attribute__ ((unused)) hashtab_key_t key, hashtab_datum_t datum, void *data)
> > -{
> > - const uint32_t *v = data;
> > - const perm_datum_t *perdatum = datum;
> > -
> > - return *v == perdatum->s.value;
> > -}
> > -
> > static int validate_access_vector(sepol_handle_t *handle, const policydb_t *p, sepol_security_class_t tclass,
> > sepol_access_vector_t av)
> > {
> > const class_datum_t *cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
> > - uint32_t i;
> >
> > /*
> > * Check that at least one permission bit is valid.
> > * Older compilers might set invalid bits for the wildcard permission.
> > */
> > - for (i = 0; i < cladatum->permissions.nprim; i++) {
> > - if (av & (UINT32_C(1) << i)) {
> > - uint32_t v = i + 1;
> > - int rc;
> > -
> > - rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, perm_match, &v);
> > - if (rc == 1)
> > - goto good;
> > -
> > - if (cladatum->comdatum) {
> > - rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->comdatum->permissions.table, perm_match, &v);
> > - if (rc == 1)
> > - goto good;
> > - }
> > - }
> > - }
> > + if (!(av & PERMISSION_MASK(cladatum->permissions.nprim)))
> > + goto bad;
> >
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > +bad:
> > ERR(handle, "Invalid access vector");
> > return -1;
> > -
> > -good:
> > - return 0;
> > }
> >
> > static int validate_avtab_key_and_datum(avtab_key_t *k, avtab_datum_t *d, void *args)
> > --
> > 2.43.0
> >
> >
prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-02 18:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-15 16:52 [PATCH v2] libsepol: validate class permissions Christian Göttsche
2024-04-15 18:48 ` James Carter
2024-05-02 18:04 ` James Carter [this message]
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