From: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>
To: selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH] Remove shell automatic domain transitions to unconfined_t from various pam login programs
Date: Sun, 1 Sep 2019 14:46:20 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190901124620.375409-1-dac.override@gmail.com> (raw)
I think these may have been adopted from the old Red Hat targeted policy (that model only had unconfined users)
Some aspect to note:
1. The ssh_sysadm_login boolean now applies to unconfined_t as well
2. remotelogin only allows unpriv logins
The rshd module also calls unconfined_shell_domtrans() but I ignored that one because that policy currently does not have support for manual transitions with pam_selinux.
Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>
---
policy/modules/services/remotelogin.te | 4 ----
policy/modules/services/ssh.te | 4 ----
policy/modules/system/locallogin.te | 4 ----
3 files changed, 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/policy/modules/services/remotelogin.te b/policy/modules/services/remotelogin.te
index bc2292e3..c7c9c564 100644
--- a/policy/modules/services/remotelogin.te
+++ b/policy/modules/services/remotelogin.te
@@ -91,10 +91,6 @@ optional_policy(`
telnet_use_ptys(remote_login_t)
')
-optional_policy(`
- unconfined_shell_domtrans(remote_login_t)
-')
-
optional_policy(`
usermanage_read_crack_db(remote_login_t)
')
diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
index 4e75b6e1..a99ad912 100644
--- a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
+++ b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
@@ -328,10 +328,6 @@ optional_policy(`
systemd_dbus_chat_logind(sshd_t)
')
-optional_policy(`
- unconfined_shell_domtrans(sshd_t)
-')
-
optional_policy(`
xserver_domtrans_xauth(sshd_t)
xserver_link_xdm_keys(sshd_t)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te b/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
index a56f3d1f..632d2542 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
@@ -200,10 +200,6 @@ optional_policy(`
systemd_write_inherited_logind_sessions_pipes(local_login_t)
')
-optional_policy(`
- unconfined_shell_domtrans(local_login_t)
-')
-
optional_policy(`
usermanage_read_crack_db(local_login_t)
')
--
2.23.0
next reply other threads:[~2019-09-01 12:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-09-01 12:46 Dominick Grift [this message]
2019-09-04 7:25 ` [PATCH] Remove shell automatic domain transitions to unconfined_t from various pam login programs Dominick Grift
2019-09-07 20:27 ` Chris PeBenito
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