From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
ast@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
andrii@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, renauld@google.com,
revest@chromium.org, song@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 5/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached
Date: Mon, 13 May 2024 12:02:34 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202405131202.D31DB2D@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240509201421.905965-6-kpsingh@kernel.org>
On Thu, May 09, 2024 at 10:14:21PM +0200, KP Singh wrote:
> BPF LSM hooks have side-effects (even when a default value's returned)
> as some hooks end up behaving differently due to the very presence of
> the hook.
>
> The static keys guarding the BPF LSM hooks are disabled by default and
> enabled only when a BPF program is attached implementing the hook
> logic. This avoids the issue of the side-effects and also the minor
> overhead associated with the empty callback.
>
> security_file_ioctl:
> 0xff...0e30 <+0>: endbr64
> 0xff...0e34 <+4>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
> 0xff...0e39 <+9>: push %rbp
> 0xff...0e3a <+10>: push %r14
> 0xff...0e3c <+12>: push %rbx
> 0xff...0e3d <+13>: mov %rdx,%rbx
> 0xff...0e40 <+16>: mov %esi,%ebp
> 0xff...0e42 <+18>: mov %rdi,%r14
> 0xff...0e45 <+21>: jmp 0xff...0e57 <security_file_ioctl+39>
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>
> Static key enabled for SELinux
>
> 0xff...0e47 <+23>: xchg %ax,%ax
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>
> Static key disabled for BPF. This gets patched when a BPF LSM
> program is attached
>
> 0xff...0e49 <+25>: xor %eax,%eax
> 0xff...0e4b <+27>: xchg %ax,%ax
> 0xff...0e4d <+29>: pop %rbx
> 0xff...0e4e <+30>: pop %r14
> 0xff...0e50 <+32>: pop %rbp
> 0xff...0e51 <+33>: cs jmp 0xff...0000 <__x86_return_thunk>
> 0xff...0e57 <+39>: endbr64
> 0xff...0e5b <+43>: mov %r14,%rdi
> 0xff...0e5e <+46>: mov %ebp,%esi
> 0xff...0e60 <+48>: mov %rbx,%rdx
> 0xff...0e63 <+51>: call 0xff...33c0 <selinux_file_ioctl>
> 0xff...0e68 <+56>: test %eax,%eax
> 0xff...0e6a <+58>: jne 0xff...0e4d <security_file_ioctl+29>
> 0xff...0e6c <+60>: jmp 0xff...0e47 <security_file_ioctl+23>
> 0xff...0e6e <+62>: endbr64
> 0xff...0e72 <+66>: mov %r14,%rdi
> 0xff...0e75 <+69>: mov %ebp,%esi
> 0xff...0e77 <+71>: mov %rbx,%rdx
> 0xff...0e7a <+74>: call 0xff...e3b0 <bpf_lsm_file_ioctl>
> 0xff...0e7f <+79>: test %eax,%eax
> 0xff...0e81 <+81>: jne 0xff...0e4d <security_file_ioctl+29>
> 0xff...0e83 <+83>: jmp 0xff...0e49 <security_file_ioctl+25>
> 0xff...0e85 <+85>: endbr64
> 0xff...0e89 <+89>: mov %r14,%rdi
> 0xff...0e8c <+92>: mov %ebp,%esi
> 0xff...0e8e <+94>: mov %rbx,%rdx
> 0xff...0e91 <+97>: pop %rbx
> 0xff...0e92 <+98>: pop %r14
> 0xff...0e94 <+100>: pop %rbp
> 0xff...0e95 <+101>: ret
>
> This patch enables this by providing a LSM_HOOK_INIT_TOGGLEABLE
> variant which allows the LSMs to opt-in to toggleable hooks which can
> be toggled on/off with security_toogle_hook.
>
> Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
With the issue Tetsuo noted fixed:
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-13 19:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-09 20:14 [PATCH v11 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2024-05-09 20:14 ` [PATCH v11 1/5] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling KP Singh
2024-05-09 20:14 ` [PATCH v11 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time KP Singh
2024-05-10 16:47 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-05-09 20:14 ` [PATCH v11 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2024-05-09 20:14 ` [PATCH v11 4/5] security: Update non standard hooks to use " KP Singh
2024-05-10 17:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-05-13 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2024-05-09 20:14 ` [PATCH v11 5/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh
2024-05-09 21:55 ` Tetsuo Handa
2024-05-10 17:11 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-05-13 19:02 ` Kees Cook [this message]
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