From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
To: casey@schaufler-ca.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 0/5] Smack transmute fixes
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2023 10:01:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231116090125.187209-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
The first two patches are obvious fixes, the first restricts setting the
SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr only for directories, and the second makes it
possible to set SMACK64TRANSMUTE if the filesystem does not support xattrs
(e.g. ramfs).
The remaining fixes are optional, and only required if we want filesystems
without xattr support behave like those with xattr support. Since we have
the inode_setsecurity and inode_getsecurity hooks to make the first group
work, it seems useful to fix inode creation too (SELinux should be fine).
The third patch is merely a code move out of the 'if (xattr)' condition.
The fourth updates the security field of the in-memory inode directly in
smack_inode_init_security() and marks the inode as instantiated, and the
fifth adds a security_inode_init_security() call in ramfs to initialize the
security field of the in-memory inodes (needed to test transmuting
directories).
Both the Smack (on xfs) and IMA test suite succeed with all patches
applied. Tests were not executed on v3 (trivial changes).
By executing the tests in a ramfs, the results are:
Without the patches:
86 Passed, 9 Failed, 90% Success rate
With the patches:
93 Passed, 2 Failed, 97% Success rate
The remaining two failures are:
2151 ioctl(4, BTRFS_IOC_CLONE or FICLONE, 3) = -1 EOPNOTSUPP (Operation not supported)
2152 lsetxattr("./targets/proc-attr-Snap", "security.SMACK64EXEC", "Pop", 3, 0) = -1 EOPNOTSUPP (Operation not supported)
The first one is likely due ramfs lack of support for ioctl() while the
second could be fixed by handling SMACK64EXEC in smack_inode_setsecurity().
The patch set applies on top of lsm/dev, commit e246777e2a03 ("MAINTAINERS:
update the LSM entry").
The ramfs patch potentially could be useful to correctly initialize the
label of new inodes in the initramfs, assuming that it will be fully
labeled with support for xattrs in the cpio image:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20190523121803.21638-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com/
Ramfs inode labels will be set from xattrs with the inode_setsecurity hook.
Changelog
v2:
- Replace return with goto in the ramfs patch, for better maintainability
(suggested by Andrew Morton)
v1:
- Rebase on top of latest lsm/next
- Remove -EOPNOTSUPP check in patch 5 (cannot happen)
Roberto Sassu (5):
smack: Set SMACK64TRANSMUTE only for dirs in smack_inode_setxattr()
smack: Handle SMACK64TRANSMUTE in smack_inode_setsecurity()
smack: Always determine inode labels in smack_inode_init_security()
smack: Initialize the in-memory inode in smack_inode_init_security()
ramfs: Initialize security of in-memory inodes
fs/ramfs/inode.c | 32 ++++++++++++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
2 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
--
2.34.1
next reply other threads:[~2023-11-16 9:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-16 9:01 Roberto Sassu [this message]
2023-11-16 9:01 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] smack: Set SMACK64TRANSMUTE only for dirs in smack_inode_setxattr() Roberto Sassu
2023-11-16 9:01 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] smack: Handle SMACK64TRANSMUTE in smack_inode_setsecurity() Roberto Sassu
2023-11-16 9:01 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] smack: Always determine inode labels in smack_inode_init_security() Roberto Sassu
2023-11-16 9:01 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] smack: Initialize the in-memory inode " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-16 9:01 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] ramfs: Initialize security of in-memory inodes Roberto Sassu
2024-01-12 8:17 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-01-16 8:39 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-01-26 1:08 ` Andrew Morton
2024-01-26 7:53 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-01-26 16:27 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-01-24 22:31 ` [PATCH v3 0/5] Smack transmute fixes Casey Schaufler
2024-01-25 8:44 ` Roberto Sassu
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