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From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>, Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>,
	linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 01/19] nvme-keyring: restrict match length for version '1' identifiers
Date: Wed,  8 May 2024 12:22:47 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240508102305.108949-2-hare@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240508102305.108949-1-hare@kernel.org>

TP8018 changed the TLS PSK identifiers to append a PSK hash value,
so to lookup identifiers we should just consider the length of
the match value, not the length of the identifiers to compare
against.
And we should modify the PSK lookup algorithm to prefer v1 identifiers
as they can be uniquely identified.

Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
index 6f7e7a8fa5ae..c60ebbdc52b8 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
@@ -36,14 +36,12 @@ static bool nvme_tls_psk_match(const struct key *key,
 		pr_debug("%s: no key description\n", __func__);
 		return false;
 	}
-	match_len = strlen(key->description);
-	pr_debug("%s: id %s len %zd\n", __func__, key->description, match_len);
-
 	if (!match_data->raw_data) {
 		pr_debug("%s: no match data\n", __func__);
 		return false;
 	}
 	match_id = match_data->raw_data;
+	match_len = strlen(match_id);
 	pr_debug("%s: match '%s' '%s' len %zd\n",
 		 __func__, match_id, key->description, match_len);
 	return !memcmp(key->description, match_id, match_len);
@@ -71,7 +69,7 @@ static struct key_type nvme_tls_psk_key_type = {
 
 static struct key *nvme_tls_psk_lookup(struct key *keyring,
 		const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn,
-		int hmac, bool generated)
+		u8 hmac, u8 psk_ver, bool generated)
 {
 	char *identity;
 	size_t identity_len = (NVMF_NQN_SIZE) * 2 + 11;
@@ -82,8 +80,8 @@ static struct key *nvme_tls_psk_lookup(struct key *keyring,
 	if (!identity)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
-	snprintf(identity, identity_len, "NVMe0%c%02d %s %s",
-		 generated ? 'G' : 'R', hmac, hostnqn, subnqn);
+	snprintf(identity, identity_len, "NVMe%u%c%02u %s %s",
+		 psk_ver, generated ? 'G' : 'R', hmac, hostnqn, subnqn);
 
 	if (!keyring)
 		keyring = nvme_keyring;
@@ -109,19 +107,38 @@ static struct key *nvme_tls_psk_lookup(struct key *keyring,
  *
  * 'Retained' PSKs (ie 'generated == false')
  * should be preferred to 'generated' PSKs,
+ * PSKs with hash (psk_ver 1) should be
+ * preferred to PSKs without (psk_ver 0),
  * and SHA-384 should be preferred to SHA-256.
  */
 static struct nvme_tls_psk_priority_list {
 	bool generated;
+	u8 psk_ver;
 	enum nvme_tcp_tls_cipher cipher;
 } nvme_tls_psk_prio[] = {
 	{ .generated = false,
+	  .psk_ver = 1,
+	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA384, },
+	{ .generated = false,
+	  .psk_ver = 1,
+	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA256, },
+	{ .generated = false,
+	  .psk_ver = 0,
 	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA384, },
 	{ .generated = false,
+	  .psk_ver = 0,
+	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA256, },
+	{ .generated = true,
+	  .psk_ver = 1,
+	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA384, },
+	{ .generated = true,
+	  .psk_ver = 1,
 	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA256, },
 	{ .generated = true,
+	  .psk_ver = 0,
 	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA384, },
 	{ .generated = true,
+	  .psk_ver = 0,
 	  .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA256, },
 };
 
@@ -137,10 +154,11 @@ key_serial_t nvme_tls_psk_default(struct key *keyring,
 
 	for (prio = 0; prio < ARRAY_SIZE(nvme_tls_psk_prio); prio++) {
 		bool generated = nvme_tls_psk_prio[prio].generated;
+		u8 ver = nvme_tls_psk_prio[prio].psk_ver;
 		enum nvme_tcp_tls_cipher cipher = nvme_tls_psk_prio[prio].cipher;
 
 		tls_key = nvme_tls_psk_lookup(keyring, hostnqn, subnqn,
-					      cipher, generated);
+					      cipher, ver, generated);
 		if (!IS_ERR(tls_key)) {
 			tls_key_id = tls_key->serial;
 			key_put(tls_key);
-- 
2.35.3



  reply	other threads:[~2024-05-08 10:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-08 10:22 [PATCHv4 00/19] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` Hannes Reinecke [this message]
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 02/19] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand() Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 03/19] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_psk() Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 04/19] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_digest() Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 05/19] nvme: add nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk() Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 06/19] nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh() Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 07/19] nvme-tcp: sanitize TLS key handling Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 08/19] nvme-tcp: check for invalidated or revoked key Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 09/19] nvme: add a newline to the 'tls_key' sysfs attribute Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 10/19] nvme-sysfs: add 'tls_configured_key' " Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 11/19] nvme-sysfs: add 'tls_keyring' attribute Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 12/19] nvme-tcp: request secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 13/19] nvme-fabrics: reset connection for secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:23 ` [PATCH 14/19] nvme-tcp: reset after recovery " Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:23 ` [PATCH 15/19] nvme-tcp: do not start queues when TLS is not enabled " Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:23 ` [PATCH 16/19] nvmet-auth: allow to clear DH-HMAC-CHAP keys Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:23 ` [PATCH 17/19] nvme-target: do not check authentication status for admin commands twice Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:23 ` [PATCH 18/19] nvme-target: do not check authentication status for I/O " Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:23 ` [PATCH 19/19] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke

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