From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>, Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>,
linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH 01/17] nvme-keyring: restrict match length for version '1' identifiers
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2024 16:03:00 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240318150316.138501-2-hare@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240318150316.138501-1-hare@kernel.org>
From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
TP8018 changed the TLS PSK identifiers to append a PSK hash value,
so to lookup any version '1' identifiers we need to restrict the
match length to exclude the PSK hash value (which we don't have
when looking up keys).
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
---
drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
index 6f7e7a8fa5ae..2beac89b2246 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
@@ -36,14 +36,12 @@ static bool nvme_tls_psk_match(const struct key *key,
pr_debug("%s: no key description\n", __func__);
return false;
}
- match_len = strlen(key->description);
- pr_debug("%s: id %s len %zd\n", __func__, key->description, match_len);
-
if (!match_data->raw_data) {
pr_debug("%s: no match data\n", __func__);
return false;
}
match_id = match_data->raw_data;
+ match_len = strlen(match_id);
pr_debug("%s: match '%s' '%s' len %zd\n",
__func__, match_id, key->description, match_len);
return !memcmp(key->description, match_id, match_len);
@@ -71,7 +69,7 @@ static struct key_type nvme_tls_psk_key_type = {
static struct key *nvme_tls_psk_lookup(struct key *keyring,
const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn,
- int hmac, bool generated)
+ u8 hmac, u8 psk_ver, bool generated)
{
char *identity;
size_t identity_len = (NVMF_NQN_SIZE) * 2 + 11;
@@ -79,11 +77,11 @@ static struct key *nvme_tls_psk_lookup(struct key *keyring,
key_serial_t keyring_id;
identity = kzalloc(identity_len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!identity)
+ if (WARN_ON(!identity))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- snprintf(identity, identity_len, "NVMe0%c%02d %s %s",
- generated ? 'G' : 'R', hmac, hostnqn, subnqn);
+ snprintf(identity, identity_len, "NVMe%u%c%02u %s %s",
+ psk_ver, generated ? 'G' : 'R', hmac, hostnqn, subnqn);
if (!keyring)
keyring = nvme_keyring;
@@ -109,19 +107,38 @@ static struct key *nvme_tls_psk_lookup(struct key *keyring,
*
* 'Retained' PSKs (ie 'generated == false')
* should be preferred to 'generated' PSKs,
+ * PSKs with hash (psk_ver 1) should be
+ * preferred to PSKs without (psk_ver 0),
* and SHA-384 should be preferred to SHA-256.
*/
static struct nvme_tls_psk_priority_list {
bool generated;
+ u8 psk_ver;
enum nvme_tcp_tls_cipher cipher;
} nvme_tls_psk_prio[] = {
{ .generated = false,
+ .psk_ver = 1,
+ .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA384, },
+ { .generated = false,
+ .psk_ver = 1,
+ .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA256, },
+ { .generated = false,
+ .psk_ver = 0,
.cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA384, },
{ .generated = false,
+ .psk_ver = 0,
+ .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA256, },
+ { .generated = true,
+ .psk_ver = 1,
+ .cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA384, },
+ { .generated = true,
+ .psk_ver = 1,
.cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA256, },
{ .generated = true,
+ .psk_ver = 0,
.cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA384, },
{ .generated = true,
+ .psk_ver = 0,
.cipher = NVME_TCP_TLS_CIPHER_SHA256, },
};
@@ -137,10 +154,11 @@ key_serial_t nvme_tls_psk_default(struct key *keyring,
for (prio = 0; prio < ARRAY_SIZE(nvme_tls_psk_prio); prio++) {
bool generated = nvme_tls_psk_prio[prio].generated;
+ u8 ver = nvme_tls_psk_prio[prio].psk_ver;
enum nvme_tcp_tls_cipher cipher = nvme_tls_psk_prio[prio].cipher;
tls_key = nvme_tls_psk_lookup(keyring, hostnqn, subnqn,
- cipher, generated);
+ cipher, ver, generated);
if (!IS_ERR(tls_key)) {
tls_key_id = tls_key->serial;
key_put(tls_key);
--
2.35.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-18 15:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-03-18 15:02 [PATCHv3 00/17] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` Hannes Reinecke [this message]
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 02/17] nvme-tcp: check for invalidated or revoked key Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 20:51 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 5:18 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 03/17] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand() Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 04/17] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_psk() Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 20:59 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 5:20 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 05/17] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_digest() Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:02 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 06/17] nvme: add nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk() Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:04 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-18 11:00 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 07/17] nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh() Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 08/17] nvme-tcp: sanitize TLS key handling Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:15 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 6:48 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-08 21:07 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 21:32 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 09/17] nvme-tcp: do not quiesce admin queue in nvme_tcp_teardown_io_queues() Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:24 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-18 11:33 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 10/17] nvme: add a newline to the 'tls_key' sysfs attribute Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:24 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 11/17] nvme-tcp: request secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:41 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 5:32 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-08 21:09 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 21:48 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-21 11:14 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 12/17] nvme-fabrics: reset connection for secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:46 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 6:21 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-08 21:21 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 22:08 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-21 11:20 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-05-08 9:21 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 13/17] nvme-tcp: reset after recovery " Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:49 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 6:25 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-08 21:23 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-08 22:10 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-21 11:22 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-04-21 14:37 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-21 15:09 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 14/17] nvmet-auth: allow to clear DH-HMAC-CHAP keys Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:50 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 15/17] nvme-target: do not check authentication status for admin commands twice Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:53 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 16/17] nvme-target: do not check authentication status for I/O " Hannes Reinecke
2024-04-07 21:53 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-18 15:03 ` [PATCH 17/17] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
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