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From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
	James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, luto@amacapital.net,
	nivedita@alum.mit.edu, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH v7 11/13] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths
Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 17:27:49 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231110222751.219836-12-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231110222751.219836-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

If the MLE kernel is being powered off, rebooted or halted,
then SEXIT must be called. Note that the SEXIT GETSEC leaf
can only be called after a machine_shutdown() has been done on
these paths. The machine_shutdown() is not called on a few paths
like when poweroff action does not have a poweroff callback (into
ACPI code) or when an emergency reset is done. In these cases,
just the TXT registers are finalized but SEXIT is skipped.

Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
index 830425e6d38e..668cfc5e4c92 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/objtool.h>
 #include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/slaunch.h>
 #include <acpi/reboot.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/apic.h>
@@ -766,6 +767,7 @@ static void native_machine_restart(char *__unused)
 
 	if (!reboot_force)
 		machine_shutdown();
+	slaunch_finalize(!reboot_force);
 	__machine_emergency_restart(0);
 }
 
@@ -776,6 +778,9 @@ static void native_machine_halt(void)
 
 	tboot_shutdown(TB_SHUTDOWN_HALT);
 
+	/* SEXIT done after machine_shutdown() to meet TXT requirements */
+	slaunch_finalize(1);
+
 	stop_this_cpu(NULL);
 }
 
@@ -784,8 +789,12 @@ static void native_machine_power_off(void)
 	if (kernel_can_power_off()) {
 		if (!reboot_force)
 			machine_shutdown();
+		slaunch_finalize(!reboot_force);
 		do_kernel_power_off();
+	} else {
+		slaunch_finalize(0);
 	}
+
 	/* A fallback in case there is no PM info available */
 	tboot_shutdown(TB_SHUTDOWN_HALT);
 }
@@ -813,6 +822,7 @@ void machine_shutdown(void)
 
 void machine_emergency_restart(void)
 {
+	slaunch_finalize(0);
 	__machine_emergency_restart(1);
 }
 
-- 
2.39.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-11-10 22:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-10 22:27 [PATCH v7 00/13] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 01/13] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 02/13] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2023-11-12 18:07   ` Alyssa Ross
2023-11-16 17:55     ` ross.philipson
2024-01-31 19:40     ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 03/13] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 04/13] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 05/13] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 06/13] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2023-11-11 17:44   ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-11 18:19     ` Andrew Cooper
2023-11-11 20:36       ` James Bottomley
2023-11-13 23:21         ` Andrew Cooper
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 07/13] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 08/13] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 09/13] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2023-11-11 10:41   ` kernel test robot
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 10/13] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 23:41   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-16  0:50     ` ross.philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 12/13] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 13/13] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson

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