From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: ebiggers@kernel.org
Cc: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>,
corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, axboe@kernel.dk,
agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, fsverity@lists.linux.dev,
linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev,
audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v18 16/21] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs
Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 15:55:01 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhTK4WS6BOXqLJ4sNKXR9a17gT3vXJUBc1F11cZ_QaOYBA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1714775551-22384-17-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
On Fri, May 3, 2024 at 6:32 PM Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>
> This patch enhances fsverity's capabilities to support both integrity and
> authenticity protection by introducing the exposure of built-in
> signatures through a new LSM hook. This functionality allows LSMs,
> e.g. IPE, to enforce policies based on the authenticity and integrity of
> files, specifically focusing on built-in fsverity signatures. It enables
> a policy enforcement layer within LSMs for fsverity, offering granular
> control over the usage of authenticity claims. For instance, a policy
> could be established to permit the execution of all files with verified
> built-in fsverity signatures while restricting kernel module loading
> from specified fsverity files via fsverity digests.
>
> The introduction of a security_inode_setintegrity() hook call within
> fsverity's workflow ensures that the verified built-in signature of a file
> is exposed to LSMs. This enables LSMs to recognize and label fsverity files
> that contain a verified built-in fsverity signature. This hook is invoked
> subsequent to the fsverity_verify_signature() process, guaranteeing the
> signature's verification against fsverity's keyring. This mechanism is
> crucial for maintaining system security, as it operates in kernel space,
> effectively thwarting attempts by malicious binaries to bypass user space
> stack interactions.
>
> The second to last commit in this patch set will add a link to the IPE
> documentation in fsverity.rst.
>
> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Eric, are you okay with the fs-verity patches in v18? If so, it would
be nice to get your ACK on this patch at the very least.
While it looks like there may be a need for an additional respin to
address some new/different feedback from the device-mapper folks, that
shouldn't affect the fs-verity portions of the patchset.
--
paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-14 19:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-03 22:32 [PATCH v18 00/21] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 01/21] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 02/21] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 03/21] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 04/21] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 05/21] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs() Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 06/21] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 07/21] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 08/21] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 09/21] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 10/21] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 11/21] block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block device Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 12/21] dm: add finalize hook to target_type Fan Wu
2024-05-08 17:17 ` Mikulas Patocka
2024-05-08 22:30 ` Fan Wu
2024-05-09 17:07 ` Mikulas Patocka
2024-05-17 19:13 ` Fan Wu
2024-05-20 12:31 ` Mikulas Patocka
2024-05-21 21:42 ` Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 13/21] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 14/21] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 15/21] security: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 16/21] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs Fan Wu
2024-05-14 19:55 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 17/21] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 18/21] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 19/21] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 20/21] Documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2024-05-04 8:04 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2024-05-04 20:13 ` Fan Wu
2024-05-05 0:15 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2024-05-14 19:50 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 21/21] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information Fan Wu
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=CAHC9VhTK4WS6BOXqLJ4sNKXR9a17gT3vXJUBc1F11cZ_QaOYBA@mail.gmail.com \
--to=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=agk@redhat.com \
--cc=audit@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=axboe@kernel.dk \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com \
--cc=dm-devel@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=ebiggers@kernel.org \
--cc=eparis@redhat.com \
--cc=fsverity@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=linux-block@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=snitzer@kernel.org \
--cc=tytso@mit.edu \
--cc=wufan@linux.microsoft.com \
--cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for read-only IMAP folder(s) and NNTP newsgroup(s).