From: "Kaplan, David" <David.Kaplan@amd.com>
To: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>,
"Kardashevskiy, Alexey" <Alexey.Kardashevskiy@amd.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
"Giani, Dhaval" <Dhaval.Giani@amd.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Kardashevskiy, Alexey" <Alexey.Kardashevskiy@amd.com>,
"steffen.eiden@ibm.com" <steffen.eiden@ibm.com>,
"yilun.xu@intel.com" <yilun.xu@intel.com>,
Suzuki K P <suzuki.kp@gmail.com>,
"Powell, Jeremy" <Jeremy.Powell@amd.com>,
"atishp04@gmail.com" <atishp04@gmail.com>,
"linux-coco@lists.linux.dev" <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Subject: RE: RE: KVM Forum BoF on I/O + secure virtualization
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2023 14:32:09 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <SN6PR12MB27020315DA2843E089F0EA199450A@SN6PR12MB2702.namprd12.prod.outlook.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230608091202.GA962@wunner.de>
[AMD Official Use Only - General]
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
> Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 4:12 AM
> To: Kardashevskiy, Alexey <Alexey.Kardashevskiy@amd.com>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>; Giani, Dhaval
> <Dhaval.Giani@amd.com>; Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>;
> Kardashevskiy, Alexey <Alexey.Kardashevskiy@amd.com>; Kaplan, David
> <David.Kaplan@amd.com>; steffen.eiden@ibm.com; yilun.xu@intel.com;
> Suzuki K P <suzuki.kp@gmail.com>; Powell, Jeremy
> <Jeremy.Powell@amd.com>; atishp04@gmail.com; linux-
> coco@lists.linux.dev; kvm@vger.kernel.org; Jonathan Cameron
> <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>; Sean Christopherson
> <seanjc@google.com>
> Subject: Re: RE: KVM Forum BoF on I/O + secure virtualization
>
> Caution: This message originated from an External Source. Use proper
> caution when opening attachments, clicking links, or responding.
>
>
> [cc += Jonathan, Sean]
>
> On Thu, Jun 08, 2023 at 09:18:12AM +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> > On 6/6/23 12:43, Dan Williams wrote:
> > > Giani, Dhaval wrote:
> > > > We have proposed a trusted I/O BoF session at KVM forum this year.
> > > > I wanted to kick off the discussion to maximize the 25 mins we have.
> > > >
> > > > By trusted I/O, I mean using TDISP to have "trusted"
> > > > communications with a device using something like AMD SEV-TIO [1]
> > > > or Intel's TDX connect [2].
> > > >
> > > > Some topics we would like to discuss are o What is the device
> > > > model like?
> > > > o Do we enlighten the PCI subsystem?
> > > > o Do we enlighten device drivers?
> > >
> > > One observation in relation to these first questions is something
> > > that has been brewing since SPDM and IDE were discussed at Plumbers
> 2022.
> > >
> > > https://lpc.events/event/16/contributions/1304/
> > >
> > > Namely, that there is value in the base specs on the way to the full
> > > vendor TSM implementations. I.e. that if the Linux kernel can aspire
> > > to the role of a TSM it becomes easier to incrementally add proxying
> > > to a platform TSM later. In the meantime, platforms and endpoints
> > > that support CMA / SPDM and PCIe/CXL IDE but not full "trusted I/O"
> > > still gain incremental benefit.
> >
> > TSM on the AMD hardware is a PSP firmware and it is going to implement
> > all of SPDM/IDE and the only proxying the host kernel will do is PCI DOE.
>
> Sean has voiced a scathing critique of this model where a firmware does all
> the attestation and hence needs to be trusted:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y+aP8rHr6H3LIf%2Fc@google.com/
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZEfrjtgGgm1lpadq@google.com/
>
> I think we need to entertain the idea that Linux does the attestation and
> encryption setup itself. Reliance on a "trusted" hardware module should be
> optional.
In the SEV-TIO model, the AMD FW implements TDISP/SPDM/IDE but it does *not* do the verification of the attestation information. That is, it gathers the attestation info from the device but it is the guest software which makes the decision on whether that information is "good" or not. Until the guest accepts the attestation, the device remains outside of the TCB of the guest. How exactly software will make that decision is an open question (is it dynamic code in the driver? Is it checked via a static manifest? Something else?) but I want to clarify that AMD FW is not making any trust decisions on behalf of the guest here.
>
> That also works for KVM: The guest can perform attestation on its own
> behalf, setup encryption and drive the TDISP state machine. If the guest's
> memory is encrypted with SEV or TDX, the IDE keys generated by the guest
> are invisible to the VMM and hence confidentiality is achieved.
> The guest can communicate the keys securely to the device via IDE_KM and
> the guest can ask the device to lock down via TDISP.
>
> Yes, the guest may need to rely on the PSP firmware to program the IDE key
> into the Root Port. Can you provide that as a service from the PSP firmware?
There is not one set of IDE keys per guest/device pair, that would be impractical from a HW standpoint. Instead in the SEV-TIO architecture, there is one set of IDE keys per host/device pair, and traffic from all guests flows over that same stream. Internal logic in the AMD SoC does access control to ensure that only the correct guest is able to generate trusted packets to specific MMIO addresses on that stream.
So what happens is the AMD FW sets up the IDE stream at the device level, but then individual guests can be bound to individual TDIs.
We have more details at https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/developer/sev-tio-whitepaper.pdf. Jeremy is also doing a talk at KVM Forum next week on this.
I'll also note that we understand SEV-TIO is not the only potential use case for these technologies like SPDM/IDE, and there may be bare-metal use cases, or other trust models.
Thanks --David Kaplan
>
> What you seem to be arguing for is a "fat" firmware which does all the
> attestation. The host kernel is relegated to being a mere DOE proxy.
> And the guest is relegated to being a "dumb" receiver of the firmware's
> attestation results.
>
> What I'm arguing for is a "thin" firmware which provides a minimized set of
> services (such as selecting a free IDE stream in the Root Port and writing keys
> into it).
>
> The host kernel can perform attestation and set up encryption for devices it
> wants to use itself. Once it passes through a device to a guest, the host
> kernel no longer performs any SPDM exchanges with the device as it's now
> owned by the guest. The guest is responsible for performing attestation and
> set up encryption for itself, possibly with the help of firmware.
>
> If there is no firmware to program IDE keys into the Root Port, the guest
> must ask the VMM to do that. The VMM then becomes part of the guest's
> TCB, but that trade-off is unavoidable if there's no firmware assistance.
> Some customers (such as Sean) seem to prefer that to trusting a vendor-
> provided firmware.
>
> Remember, this must work for everyone, not just for people who are happy
> with AMD's and Intel's shrink-wrapped offerings.
>
> We can discuss an _OSC bit to switch between firmware-driven attestation
> and OS-native attestation, similar to the existing bits for PCIe hotplug, DPC
> etc.
>
> However, past experience with firmware-handled hotplug and DPC has
> generally been negative and I believe most everyone is preferring the OS-
> native variant nowadays. The OS has a better overall knowledge of the
> system state than the firmware. E.g. the kernel can detect hotplug events
> caused by DPC and ignore them (see commit a97396c6eb13).
>
> Similarly, the CMA-SPDM patches I'm working on reauthenticate devices after
> a DPC-induced Hot Reset or after resume from D3cold. I imagine it may be
> difficult to achieve the same if attestation is handled by firmware.
>
> I'm talking about commit "PCI/CMA: Reauthenticate devices on reset and
> resume" on this development branch:
>
> https://github.com/l1k/linux/commits/doe
>
> Thanks,
>
> Lukas
prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-08 14:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <c2db1a80-722b-c807-76b5-b8672cb0db09@redhat.com>
2023-06-02 18:04 ` KVM Forum BoF on I/O + secure virtualization Giani, Dhaval
2023-06-06 2:43 ` Dan Williams
2023-06-07 23:18 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-06-08 9:12 ` Lukas Wunner
2023-06-08 14:32 ` Kaplan, David [this message]
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