From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
To: ksummit@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [MAINTAINERS/KERNEL SUMMIT] Trust and maintenance of file systems
Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2023 16:07:39 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZO9NK0FchtYjOuIH@infradead.org> (raw)
Hi all,
we have a lot of on-disk file system drivers in Linux, which I consider
a good thing as it allows a lot of interoperability. At the same time
maintaining them is a burden, and there is a lot expectation on how
they are maintained.
Part 1: untrusted file systems
There has been a lot of syzbot fuzzing using generated file system
images, which I again consider a very good thing as syzbot is good
a finding bugs. Unfortunately it also finds a lot of bugs that no
one is interested in fixing. The reason for that is that file system
maintainers only consider a tiny subset of the file system drivers,
and for some of them a subset of the format options to be trusted vs
untrusted input. It thus is not just a waste of time for syzbot itself,
but even more so for the maintainers to report fuzzing bugs in other
implementations.
What can we do to only mark certain file systems (and format options)
as trusted on untrusted input and remove a lot of the current tension
and make everyone work more efficiently? Note that this isn't even
getting into really trusted on-disk formats, which is a security
discussion on it's own, but just into formats where the maintainers
are interested in dealing with fuzzed images.
Part 2: unmaintained file systems
A lot of our file system drivers are either de facto or formally
unmaintained. If we want to move the kernel forward by finishing
API transitions (new mount API, buffer_head removal for the I/O path,
->writepage removal, etc) these file systems need to change as well
and need some kind of testing. The easiest way forward would be
to remove everything that is not fully maintained, but that would
remove a lot of useful features.
E.g. the hfsplus driver is unmaintained despite collecting odd fixes.
It collects odd fixes because it is really useful for interoperating
with MacOS and it would be a pity to remove it. At the same time
it is impossible to test changes to hfsplus sanely as there is no
mkfs.hfsplus or fsck.hfsplus available for Linux. We used to have
one that was ported from the open source Darwin code drops, and
I managed to get xfstests to run on hfsplus with them, but this
old version doesn't compile on any modern Linux distribution and
new versions of the code aren't trivially portable to Linux.
Do we have volunteers with old enough distros that we can list as
testers for this code? Do we have any other way to proceed?
If we don't, are we just going to untested API changes to these
code bases, or keep the old APIs around forever?
next reply other threads:[~2023-08-30 14:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 97+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-08-30 14:07 Christoph Hellwig [this message]
2023-09-05 23:06 ` [MAINTAINERS/KERNEL SUMMIT] Trust and maintenance of file systems Dave Chinner
2023-09-05 23:23 ` Matthew Wilcox
2023-09-06 2:09 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-06 15:06 ` Christian Brauner
2023-09-06 15:59 ` Christian Brauner
2023-09-06 19:09 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2023-09-08 8:34 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-09-07 0:46 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2023-09-09 12:50 ` James Bottomley
2023-09-09 15:44 ` Matthew Wilcox
2023-09-10 19:51 ` James Bottomley
2023-09-10 20:19 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-09-10 21:15 ` Guenter Roeck
2023-09-11 3:10 ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-09-11 19:03 ` James Bottomley
2023-09-12 0:23 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-12 16:52 ` H. Peter Anvin
2023-09-09 22:42 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-09-10 8:19 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2023-09-10 8:37 ` Bernd Schubert
2023-09-10 16:35 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-09-10 17:26 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2023-09-10 17:35 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-09-11 1:05 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-11 1:29 ` Kent Overstreet
2023-09-11 2:07 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-11 13:35 ` David Disseldorp
2023-09-11 17:45 ` Bart Van Assche
2023-09-11 19:11 ` David Disseldorp
2023-09-11 23:05 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-26 5:24 ` Eric W. Biederman
2023-09-08 8:55 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-09-08 22:47 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-06 22:32 ` Guenter Roeck
2023-09-06 22:54 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-07 0:53 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2023-09-07 3:14 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-07 1:53 ` Steven Rostedt
2023-09-07 2:22 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-07 2:51 ` Steven Rostedt
2023-09-07 3:26 ` Matthew Wilcox
2023-09-07 8:04 ` Thorsten Leemhuis
2023-09-07 10:29 ` Christian Brauner
2023-09-07 11:18 ` Thorsten Leemhuis
2023-09-07 12:04 ` Matthew Wilcox
2023-09-07 12:57 ` Guenter Roeck
2023-09-07 13:56 ` Christian Brauner
2023-09-08 8:44 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-09-07 3:38 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-07 11:18 ` Steven Rostedt
2023-09-13 16:43 ` Eric Sandeen
2023-09-13 16:58 ` Guenter Roeck
2023-09-13 17:03 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-09-15 22:48 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-16 19:44 ` Steven Rostedt
2023-09-16 21:50 ` James Bottomley
2023-09-17 1:40 ` NeilBrown
2023-09-17 17:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-09-17 18:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-09-17 18:57 ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-09-17 19:45 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-09-18 11:14 ` Jan Kara
2023-09-18 17:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-09-18 19:32 ` Jiri Kosina
2023-09-18 19:59 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-09-18 20:50 ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-09-18 22:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-09-18 20:33 ` H. Peter Anvin
2023-09-19 4:56 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-25 9:43 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-09-27 22:23 ` Dave Kleikamp
2023-09-19 1:15 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-19 5:17 ` Matthew Wilcox
2023-09-19 16:34 ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-09-19 16:45 ` Matthew Wilcox
2023-09-19 17:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-09-19 22:57 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-18 14:54 ` Bill O'Donnell
2023-09-19 2:44 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-19 16:57 ` James Bottomley
2023-09-25 9:38 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-09-25 14:14 ` Dan Carpenter
2023-09-25 16:50 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-09-07 9:48 ` Dan Carpenter
2023-09-07 11:04 ` Segher Boessenkool
2023-09-07 11:22 ` Steven Rostedt
2023-09-07 12:24 ` Segher Boessenkool
2023-09-07 11:23 ` Dan Carpenter
2023-09-07 12:30 ` Segher Boessenkool
2023-09-12 9:50 ` Richard Biener
2023-10-23 5:19 ` Eric Gallager
2023-09-08 8:39 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-09-08 8:38 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-09-08 23:21 ` Dave Chinner
2023-09-07 0:48 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2023-09-07 3:07 ` Guenter Roeck
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