From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@gmail.com>,
Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list)
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] KEYS: trusted: tpm2: Use struct tpm_buf for sized buffers
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 03:36:30 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230821033630.1039527-6-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230821033630.1039527-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
Take advantage of the new sized buffer (TPM2B) mode of struct tpm_buf in
tpm2_seal_trusted(). This allows to add robustness to the command
construction without requiring to calculate buffer sizes manually.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 42 ++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index c41f30770138..a976de3c28ae 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -228,8 +228,8 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options)
{
+ struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
int blob_len = 0;
- struct tpm_buf buf;
u32 hash;
u32 flags;
int i;
@@ -258,6 +258,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
return rc;
}
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&sized, true, true);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ tpm_put_ops(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle);
tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW,
@@ -267,36 +274,36 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* sensitive */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->blobauth_len);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len);
if (options->blobauth_len)
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len);
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, payload->key_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(&sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, sized.data, sized.length);
/* public */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash);
+ tpm_buf_init(&sized, false, true);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, hash);
/* key properties */
flags = 0;
flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
- flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM |
- TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, flags);
+ flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&sized, flags);
/* policy */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->policydigest_len);
if (options->policydigest_len)
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest,
- options->policydigest_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
/* public parameters */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, 0);
+
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, sized.data, sized.length);
/* outside info */
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
@@ -328,6 +335,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
blob_len);
out:
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&sized);
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
if (rc > 0) {
--
2.39.2
prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-21 3:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-08-21 3:36 [PATCH 0/5] Extend struct tpm_buf to support sized buffers (TPM2B) Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-08-21 3:36 ` [PATCH 1/5] tpm: Move buffer handling from static inlines to real functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-08-21 3:36 ` [PATCH 2/5] tpm: Store TPM buffer length Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-08-21 3:36 ` [PATCH 3/5] tpm: Detach tpm_buf_reset() from tpm_buf_init() Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-08-21 3:36 ` [PATCH 4/5] tpm: Support TPM2 sized buffers (TPM2B) Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-08-21 3:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
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