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From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: oss-security <oss-security@lists.openwall.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org,
	 Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	 Ubuntu Kernel Team <kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com>
Subject: lockdown bypass on mainline kernel for loading unsigned modules
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2020 04:26:37 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHmME9rmAznrAmEQTOaLeMM82iMFTfCNfpxDGXw4CJjuVEF_gQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)

Hi everyone,

Yesterday, I found a lockdown bypass in Ubuntu 18.04's kernel using
ACPI table tricks via the efi ssdt variable [1]. Today I found another
one that's a bit easier to exploit and appears to be unpatched on
mainline, using acpi_configfs to inject an ACPI table. The tricks are
basically the same as the first one, but this one appears to be
unpatched, at least on my test machine. Explanation is in the header
of the PoC:

https://git.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language/tree/american-unsigned-language-2.sh

I need to get some sleep, but if nobody posts a patch in the
meanwhile, I'll try to post a fix tomorrow.

Jason

[1] https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/06/14/1

             reply	other threads:[~2020-06-15 10:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-15 10:26 Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2020-06-15 10:43 ` [PATCH] acpi: disallow loading configfs acpi tables when locked down Jason A. Donenfeld
2020-06-16 22:20   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2020-06-17  8:37     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-06-17  8:42       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2020-06-17 16:52       ` Kaneda, Erik
2020-06-22 14:45     ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2020-06-15 16:22 ` [oss-security] lockdown bypass on mainline kernel for loading unsigned modules John Haxby
2020-06-15 17:02   ` Jann Horn
2020-06-15 17:28     ` Jason A. Donenfeld

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