From: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] Encrypted Message
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2019 02:33:21 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <69f56234-a875-917d-a8c1-b82b81144af9@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1ce79648-6263-d726-bb69-da54131535a2@intel.com>
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From: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
To: speck for Dave Hansen <speck@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 05/28] MDSv4 10
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On 1/14/19 2:20 PM, speck for Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 1/11/19 5:29 PM, speck for Andi Kleen wrote:
>> When entering idle the internal state of the current CPU might
>> become visible to the thread sibling because the CPU "frees" some
>> internal resources.
>
> Is there some documentation somewhere about what "idle" means here? It
> looks like MWAIT and HLT certainly count, but is there anything else?
We know power state transitions in addition can cause the peer to
dynamically sleep or wake up. MWAIT was the main example I got out of
Intel for how you'd explicitly cause a thread to be deallocated.
When Andi is talking about "frees" above he means (for example) the
dynamic allocation/deallocation of store buffer entries as threads come
and go - e.g. in Skylake there are 56 entries in a distributed store
buffer that splits into 2x28. I am not aware of fill buffer behavior
changing as threads come and go, and this isn't documented AFAICS.
I've been wondering whether we want a bit more detail in the docs. I
spent a /lot/ of time last week going through all of Intel's patents in
this area, which really help understand it. If folks feel we could do
with a bit more meaty summary, I can try to suggest something.
Jon.
--
Computer Architect | Sent with my Fedora powered laptop
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-18 7:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-12 1:29 [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 00/28] MDSv4 2 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 01/28] MDSv4 3 Andi Kleen
2019-01-15 14:11 ` [MODERATED] " Andrew Cooper
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 02/28] MDSv4 22 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 03/28] MDSv4 20 Andi Kleen
2019-01-14 18:50 ` [MODERATED] " Dave Hansen
2019-01-14 19:29 ` Andi Kleen
2019-01-14 19:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 04/28] MDSv4 8 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 05/28] MDSv4 10 Andi Kleen
2019-01-14 19:20 ` [MODERATED] " Dave Hansen
2019-01-14 19:31 ` Andi Kleen
2019-01-18 7:33 ` Jon Masters [this message]
2019-01-14 23:39 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Tim Chen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 06/28] MDSv4 11 Andi Kleen
2019-01-14 19:23 ` [MODERATED] " Dave Hansen
2019-01-15 12:01 ` Jiri Kosina
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 07/28] MDSv4 0 Andi Kleen
2019-01-14 4:03 ` [MODERATED] " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-14 4:38 ` Andi Kleen
2019-01-14 4:55 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 08/28] MDSv4 19 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 09/28] MDSv4 16 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 10/28] MDSv4 24 Andi Kleen
2019-01-15 1:05 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Tim Chen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 11/28] MDSv4 21 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 12/28] MDSv4 25 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 13/28] MDSv4 4 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 14/28] MDSv4 17 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 15/28] MDSv4 9 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 16/28] MDSv4 6 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 17/28] MDSv4 18 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 18/28] MDSv4 26 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 19/28] MDSv4 14 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 20/28] MDSv4 23 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 21/28] MDSv4 15 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 22/28] MDSv4 5 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 23/28] MDSv4 13 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 24/28] MDSv4 28 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 25/28] MDSv4 1 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 26/28] MDSv4 27 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 27/28] MDSv4 7 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 1:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v4 28/28] MDSv4 12 Andi Kleen
2019-01-12 3:04 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v4 00/28] MDSv4 2 Andi Kleen
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2019-03-05 16:43 [MODERATED] Starting to go public? Linus Torvalds
2019-03-05 17:02 ` [MODERATED] " Andrew Cooper
2019-03-05 20:36 ` Jiri Kosina
2019-03-05 22:31 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-03-06 16:18 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-05 17:10 ` Jon Masters
2019-03-04 1:21 [MODERATED] [PATCH RFC 0/4] Proposed cmdline improvements Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04 1:23 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH RFC 1/4] 1 Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04 3:55 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-04 7:30 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH RFC 1/4] 1 Greg KH
2019-03-04 7:45 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-04 1:24 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH RFC 3/4] 3 Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04 3:58 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-04 17:17 ` [MODERATED] " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-06 16:22 ` [MODERATED] " Jon Masters
2019-03-04 1:25 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH RFC 4/4] 4 Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04 4:07 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-01 21:47 [patch V6 00/14] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 06/14] MDS basics 6 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-04 6:28 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 08/14] MDS basics 8 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-04 6:57 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-04 7:06 ` Jon Masters
2019-03-04 8:12 ` Jon Masters
2019-03-05 15:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-06 16:21 ` [MODERATED] " Jon Masters
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 10/14] MDS basics 10 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-04 6:45 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-01 21:47 ` [patch V6 12/14] MDS basics 12 Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-04 5:47 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-04 5:30 ` Jon Masters
2019-02-24 15:07 [MODERATED] [PATCH v6 00/43] MDSv6 Andi Kleen
2019-02-24 15:07 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v6 10/43] MDSv6 Andi Kleen
2019-02-25 16:30 ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-02-25 16:41 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-02-24 15:07 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v6 31/43] MDSv6 Andi Kleen
2019-02-25 15:19 ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-02-25 15:34 ` Andi Kleen
2019-02-25 15:49 ` Greg KH
2019-02-25 15:52 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-02-25 16:00 ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-02-25 16:19 ` [MODERATED] " Jon Masters
2019-02-22 22:24 [patch V4 00/11] MDS basics Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 04/11] x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffer() Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-26 14:19 ` [MODERATED] " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-01 20:58 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-01 22:14 ` Jon Masters
2019-02-21 23:44 [patch V3 0/9] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-21 23:44 ` [patch V3 4/9] MDS basics 4 Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 7:45 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-02-20 15:07 [patch V2 00/10] MDS basics+ 0 Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-20 15:07 ` [patch V2 04/10] MDS basics+ 4 Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-20 17:10 ` [MODERATED] " mark gross
2019-02-21 19:26 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Tim Chen
2019-02-19 12:44 [patch 0/8] MDS basics 0 Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-21 16:14 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-02-07 23:41 [MODERATED] [PATCH v3 0/6] PERFv3 Andi Kleen
2019-02-07 23:41 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v3 2/6] PERFv3 Andi Kleen
2019-02-08 0:51 ` [MODERATED] Re: [SUSPECTED SPAM][PATCH " Andrew Cooper
2019-02-08 9:01 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-08 9:39 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-08 10:53 ` [MODERATED] [RFC][PATCH] performance walnuts Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-15 23:45 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2018-06-12 17:29 [MODERATED] FYI - Reading uncached memory Jon Masters
2018-06-14 16:59 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Tim Chen
2018-05-29 19:42 [MODERATED] [PATCH 0/2] L1TF KVM 0 Paolo Bonzini
[not found] ` <20180529194240.7F1336110A@crypto-ml.lab.linutronix.de>
2018-05-29 22:49 ` [PATCH 1/2] L1TF KVM 1 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-29 23:54 ` [MODERATED] " Andrew Cooper
2018-05-30 9:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-06-04 8:24 ` [MODERATED] " Martin Pohlack
2018-06-04 13:11 ` [MODERATED] Is: Tim, Q to you. Was:Re: " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-04 17:59 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Tim Chen
2018-06-05 23:34 ` Tim Chen
2018-06-05 23:37 ` Tim Chen
2018-06-07 19:11 ` Tim Chen
2018-05-17 20:53 SSB status - V18 pushed out Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-18 13:54 ` [MODERATED] Is: Sleep states ?Was:Re: " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-05-18 14:29 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-18 19:50 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Tim Chen
2018-05-02 21:51 [patch V11 00/16] SSB 0 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-03 4:27 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Tim Chen
2018-04-24 9:06 [MODERATED] L1D-Fault KVM mitigation Joerg Roedel
2018-04-24 9:35 ` [MODERATED] " Peter Zijlstra
2018-04-24 9:48 ` David Woodhouse
2018-04-24 11:04 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-05-23 9:45 ` David Woodhouse
2018-05-24 9:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-05-24 15:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-24 15:33 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-24 23:18 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Tim Chen
2018-05-25 18:22 ` Tim Chen
2018-05-26 19:14 ` L1D-Fault KVM mitigation Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-29 19:29 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Tim Chen
2018-05-29 21:14 ` L1D-Fault KVM mitigation Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-30 16:38 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Tim Chen
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