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From: Gary Lin via Grub-devel <grub-devel@gnu.org>
To: The development of GNU GRUB <grub-devel@gnu.org>
Cc: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>,
	Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>,
	'Daniel Kiper ' <dkiper@net-space.pl>,
	shkhisti@microsoft.com, jaskaran.khurana@microsoft.com,
	christopher.co@microsoft.com, daniel.mihai@microsoft.com,
	jaredz@redhat.com, development@efficientek.com,
	jejb@linux.ibm.com, mchang@suse.com, Fabian Vogt <fvogt@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 20/20] diskfilter: look up cryptodisk devices first
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 15:16:44 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231120071644.14547-21-glin@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231120071644.14547-1-glin@suse.com>

When using disk auto-unlocking with TPM 2.0, the typical grub.cfg may
look like this:

  tpm2_key_protector_init --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/boot/grub2/sealed.tpm
  cryptomount -u <PART-UUID> -P tpm2
  search --fs-uuid --set=root <FS-UUID>

Since the disk search order is based on the order of module loading, the
attacker could insert a malicious disk with the same FS-UUID root to
trick grub2 to boot into th malicious root and further dump memory to
steal the unsealed key.

To defend such attack, we can specify the hint provided by 'grub-probe'
to search the encrypted partition first:

search --fs-uuid --set=root --hint='cryptouuid/<PART-UUID>' <FS-UUID>

However, for LVM on a encrypted partition, the search hint provided by
'grub-probe' is:

  --hint='lvmid/<VG-UUID>/<LV-UUID>'

It doesn't guarantee to look up the logical volume from the encrypted
partition, so the attacker may have the chance to fool grub2 to boot
into the malicious disk.

To mininize the attack surface, this commit tweaks the disk device search
in diskfilter to look up cryptodisk devices first and then others, so
that the auto-unlocked disk will be found first, not the attacker's disk.

Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Cc: Fabian Vogt <fvogt@suse.com>
---
 grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c b/grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c
index 61a311efd..94832c8dd 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c
@@ -226,15 +226,32 @@ scan_devices (const char *arname)
   int need_rescan;
 
   for (pull = 0; pull < GRUB_DISK_PULL_MAX; pull++)
-    for (p = grub_disk_dev_list; p; p = p->next)
-      if (p->id != GRUB_DISK_DEVICE_DISKFILTER_ID
-	  && p->disk_iterate)
-	{
-	  if ((p->disk_iterate) (scan_disk_hook, NULL, pull))
-	    return;
-	  if (arname && is_lv_readable (find_lv (arname), 1))
-	    return;
-	}
+    {
+      /* look up the crytodisk devices first */
+      for (p = grub_disk_dev_list; p; p = p->next)
+	if (p->id == GRUB_DISK_DEVICE_CRYPTODISK_ID
+	    && p->disk_iterate)
+	  {
+	    if ((p->disk_iterate) (scan_disk_hook, NULL, pull))
+	      return;
+	    if (arname && is_lv_readable (find_lv (arname), 1))
+	      return;
+	    break;
+	  }
+
+      /* check the devices other than crytodisk */
+      for (p = grub_disk_dev_list; p; p = p->next)
+	if (p->id == GRUB_DISK_DEVICE_CRYPTODISK_ID)
+	  continue;
+	else if (p->id != GRUB_DISK_DEVICE_DISKFILTER_ID
+	    && p->disk_iterate)
+	  {
+	    if ((p->disk_iterate) (scan_disk_hook, NULL, pull))
+	      return;
+	    if (arname && is_lv_readable (find_lv (arname), 1))
+	      return;
+	  }
+    }
 
   scan_depth = 0;
   need_rescan = 1;
-- 
2.35.3


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      parent reply	other threads:[~2023-11-20  7:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-20  7:16 [PATCH v7 00/20] Automatic Disk Unlock with TPM2 Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 01/20] posix_wrap: tweaks in preparation for libtasn1 Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 02/20] libtasn1: import libtasn1-4.19.0 Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 03/20] libtasn1: disable code not needed in grub Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 04/20] libtasn1: changes for grub compatibility Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 05/20] libtasn1: compile into asn1 module Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 06/20] test_asn1: test module for libtasn1 Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 07/20] libtasn1: Add the documentation Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 08/20] protectors: Add key protectors framework Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 09/20] tpm2: Add TPM Software Stack (TSS) Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 10/20] protectors: Add TPM2 Key Protector Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 11/20] cryptodisk: Support key protectors Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 12/20] util/grub-protect: Add new tool Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 13/20] tpm2: Add TPM2 types, structures, and command constants Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 14/20] tpm2: Add more marshal/unmarshal functions Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 15/20] tpm2: Implement more TPM2 commands Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 16/20] tpm2: Support authorized policy Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 17/20] protectors: Implement NV index Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 18/20] cryptodisk: Fallback to passphrase Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` [PATCH v7 19/20] cryptodisk: wipe out the cached keys from protectors Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2023-11-20  7:16 ` Gary Lin via Grub-devel [this message]

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