From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 416BEC433FE for ; Thu, 10 Nov 2022 21:42:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232113AbiKJVlx (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 Nov 2022 16:41:53 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:51694 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229591AbiKJVlv (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 Nov 2022 16:41:51 -0500 Received: from cloud.peff.net (cloud.peff.net [104.130.231.41]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BD35731ECC for ; Thu, 10 Nov 2022 13:41:50 -0800 (PST) Received: (qmail 25574 invoked by uid 109); 10 Nov 2022 21:41:50 -0000 Received: from Unknown (HELO peff.net) (10.0.1.2) by cloud.peff.net (qpsmtpd/0.94) with ESMTP; Thu, 10 Nov 2022 21:41:50 +0000 Authentication-Results: cloud.peff.net; auth=none Received: (qmail 29983 invoked by uid 111); 10 Nov 2022 21:41:50 -0000 Received: from coredump.intra.peff.net (HELO sigill.intra.peff.net) (10.0.0.2) by peff.net (qpsmtpd/0.94) with (TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 encrypted) ESMTPS; Thu, 10 Nov 2022 16:41:50 -0500 Authentication-Results: peff.net; auth=none Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2022 16:41:49 -0500 From: Jeff King To: Johannes Schindelin Cc: Michael McClimon , Carlo Marcelo Arenas =?utf-8?B?QmVsw7Nu?= , Glen Choo , git@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] Git.pm: add semicolon after catch statement Message-ID: References: <20221016212236.12453-1-michael@mcclimon.org> <20221016212236.12453-2-michael@mcclimon.org> <28orrrr1-444q-6595-po76-3nr67r1pp4p0@tzk.qr> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <28orrrr1-444q-6595-po76-3nr67r1pp4p0@tzk.qr> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: git@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Nov 10, 2022 at 04:10:22PM +0100, Johannes Schindelin wrote: > Hi Peff, > > On Mon, 17 Oct 2022, Jeff King wrote: > > > [... talking about safe.directory ...] > > > > But curiously this still does not pass after your patch, because we seem > > to actually open the repository! I think this is because the C code > > allows an explicit GIT_DIR to override the safe-directory checks. > > Yes, I remember that this was something we discussed at some length during > the embargo: what to do with the explicitly-specified `GIT_DIR` when > verifying the ownership, and my recollection is that we asserted that > setting `GIT_DIR` qualifies for "they know what they're doing" (in > particular when it is done in a script, not interactively). Thanks for confirming. I'm not sure if you read the rest of the thread, but the bug turned out to be in Git.pm, which sets GIT_DIR without knowing what it's doing. :) We ended up with 20da61f25f (Git.pm: trust rev-parse to find bare repositories, 2022-10-22) as the fix. -Peff