From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>,
corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, fsverity@lists.linux.dev,
linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev,
audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v18 20/21] Documentation: add ipe documentation
Date: Sat, 4 May 2024 13:13:16 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ab7054cd-affd-47c3-bd98-2cf47d6a6376@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZjXsBjAFs-qp9xY4@archie.me>
On 5/4/2024 1:04 AM, Bagas Sanjaya wrote:
> On Fri, May 03, 2024 at 03:32:30PM -0700, Fan Wu wrote:
>> +IPE does not mitigate threats arising from malicious but authorized
>> +developers (with access to a signing certificate), or compromised
>> +developer tools used by them (i.e. return-oriented programming attacks).
>> +Additionally, IPE draws hard security boundary between userspace and
>> +kernelspace. As a result, IPE does not provide any protections against a
>> +kernel level exploit, and a kernel-level exploit can disable or tamper
>> +with IPE's protections.
>
> So how to mitigate kernel-level exploits then?
>
One possible way is to use hypervisor to protect the kernel integrity.
https://github.com/heki-linux is one project on this direction. Perhaps
I should also add this link to the doc.
>> +Allow only initramfs
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> <snipped>...
>> +Allow any signed and validated dm-verity volume and the initramfs
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> <snipped>...
>
> htmldocs build reports new warnings:
>
> Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst:694: WARNING: Title underline too short.
>
> Allow any signed and validated dm-verity volume and the initramfs
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst:694: WARNING: Title underline too short.
>
> Allow any signed and validated dm-verity volume and the initramfs
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> Documentation/arch/x86/resctrl.rst:577: WARNING: Title underline too short.
>
> I have to match these sections underline length:
>
> ---- >8 ----
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
> index 1a3bf1d8aa23f0..a47e14e024a90d 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
> @@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ Allow all
> DEFAULT action=ALLOW
>
> Allow only initramfs
> -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
> ::
>
> @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ Allow only initramfs
> op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW
>
> Allow any signed and validated dm-verity volume and the initramfs
> -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
> ::
>
> @@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ Allow only a specific dm-verity volume
> op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=sha256:401fcec5944823ae12f62726e8184407a5fa9599783f030dec146938 action=ALLOW
>
> Allow any fs-verity file with a valid built-in signature
> -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
> ::
>
> @@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ Allow any fs-verity file with a valid built-in signature
> op=EXECUTE fsverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW
>
> Allow execution of a specific fs-verity file
> -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
> ::
>
>
>> +Additional Information
>> +----------------------
>> +
>> +- `Github Repository <https://github.com/microsoft/ipe>`_
>> +- Documentation/security/ipe.rst
>
> Link title to both this admin-side and developer docs can be added for
> disambiguation (to avoid confusion on readers):
>
> ---- >8 ----
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
> index a47e14e024a90d..25b17e11559149 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
> @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE)
>
> This is the documentation for admins, system builders, or individuals
> attempting to use IPE. If you're looking for more developer-focused
> - documentation about IPE please see Documentation/security/ipe.rst
> + documentation about IPE please see :doc:`the design docs
> + </security/ipe>`.
>
> Overview
> --------
> @@ -748,7 +749,7 @@ Additional Information
> ----------------------
>
> - `Github Repository <https://github.com/microsoft/ipe>`_
> -- Documentation/security/ipe.rst
> +- :doc:`Developer and design docs for IPE </security/ipe>`
>
> FAQ
> ---
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/ipe.rst b/Documentation/security/ipe.rst
> index 07e3632241285d..fd1b1a852d2165 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/ipe.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/security/ipe.rst
> @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) - Kernel Documentation
>
> This is documentation targeted at developers, instead of administrators.
> If you're looking for documentation on the usage of IPE, please see
> - Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
> + `IPE admin guide </admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst>`_.
>
> Historical Motivation
> ---------------------
>
> Thanks.
>
My apologies for these format issues and thanks for the suggestions. I
will fix them.
-Fan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-04 20:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-03 22:32 [PATCH v18 00/21] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 01/21] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 02/21] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 03/21] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 04/21] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 05/21] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs() Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 06/21] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 07/21] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 08/21] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 09/21] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 10/21] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 11/21] block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block device Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 12/21] dm: add finalize hook to target_type Fan Wu
2024-05-08 17:17 ` Mikulas Patocka
2024-05-08 22:30 ` Fan Wu
2024-05-09 17:07 ` Mikulas Patocka
2024-05-17 19:13 ` Fan Wu
2024-05-20 12:31 ` Mikulas Patocka
2024-05-21 21:42 ` Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 13/21] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 14/21] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 15/21] security: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 16/21] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs Fan Wu
2024-05-14 19:55 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 17/21] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 18/21] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 19/21] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 20/21] Documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2024-05-04 8:04 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2024-05-04 20:13 ` Fan Wu [this message]
2024-05-05 0:15 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2024-05-14 19:50 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-03 22:32 ` [PATCH v18 21/21] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information Fan Wu
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