* [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
@ 2024-04-24 12:47 Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-25 8:36 ` Chengming Zhou
2024-04-26 9:20 ` Xiongwei Song
0 siblings, 2 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Nicolas Bouchinet @ 2024-04-24 12:47 UTC (permalink / raw
To: linux-mm, linux-kernel
Cc: cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim, akpm, vbabka,
roman.gushchin, 42.hyeyoo
From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions
slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call
slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object.
Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are
set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency
checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a
"Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
Object's freepointer thus needs to be properly set using
set_freepointer() after init_on_free.
To reproduce, set `slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7` on the
command line of a kernel build with `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y`.
dmesg sample log:
[ 10.708715] =============================================================================
[ 10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G B T ): Freepointer corrupt
[ 10.712695] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ 10.712695]
[ 10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
[ 10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
[ 10.716698]
[ 10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
[ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
[ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
[ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
[ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00 00 ....
[ 10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600 not freed
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
---
mm/slub.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 3aa12b9b323d9..71dbff9ad8f17 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -4342,10 +4342,16 @@ static __fastpath_inline
void slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, void *object,
unsigned long addr)
{
+ bool init = false;
+
memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1);
+ init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
- if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s))))
+ if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init))) {
+ if (init)
+ set_freepointer(s, object, NULL);
do_slab_free(s, slab, object, object, 1, addr);
+ }
}
static __fastpath_inline
--
2.44.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-24 12:47 [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free Nicolas Bouchinet
@ 2024-04-25 8:36 ` Chengming Zhou
2024-04-25 15:02 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-26 9:20 ` Xiongwei Song
1 sibling, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Chengming Zhou @ 2024-04-25 8:36 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Nicolas Bouchinet, linux-mm, linux-kernel
Cc: cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim, akpm, vbabka,
roman.gushchin, 42.hyeyoo
On 2024/4/24 20:47, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
> From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>
> Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
> separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions
> slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call
> slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
Right.
>
> If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object.
> Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are
> set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency
> checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a
> "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
IIUC, the "freepointer" can be checked on the free path only when
it's outside the object memory. Here slab_free_hook() zeroed the
freepointer and caused the problem.
But why we should zero the memory outside the object_size? It seems
more reasonable to only zero the object_size when init_on_free is set?
Thanks.
>
> Object's freepointer thus needs to be properly set using
> set_freepointer() after init_on_free.
>
> To reproduce, set `slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7` on the
> command line of a kernel build with `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y`.
>
> dmesg sample log:
> [ 10.708715] =============================================================================
> [ 10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G B T ): Freepointer corrupt
> [ 10.712695] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> [ 10.712695]
> [ 10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
> [ 10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
> [ 10.716698]
> [ 10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00 00 ....
> [ 10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600 not freed
>
> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
> ---
> mm/slub.c | 8 +++++++-
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index 3aa12b9b323d9..71dbff9ad8f17 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -4342,10 +4342,16 @@ static __fastpath_inline
> void slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, void *object,
> unsigned long addr)
> {
> + bool init = false;
> +
> memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1);
> + init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
>
> - if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s))))
> + if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init))) {
> + if (init)
> + set_freepointer(s, object, NULL);
> do_slab_free(s, slab, object, object, 1, addr);
> + }
> }
>
> static __fastpath_inline
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-25 8:36 ` Chengming Zhou
@ 2024-04-25 15:02 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-25 15:14 ` Chengming Zhou
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Nicolas Bouchinet @ 2024-04-25 15:02 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Chengming Zhou, linux-mm, linux-kernel
Cc: cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim, akpm, vbabka,
roman.gushchin, 42.hyeyoo
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4035 bytes --]
Hy,
First of all, thanks a lot for your time.
On 4/25/24 10:36, Chengming Zhou wrote:
> On 2024/4/24 20:47, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>> From: Nicolas Bouchinet<nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>>
>> Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
>> separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions
>> slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call
>> slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
> Right.
>
>> If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object.
>> Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are
>> set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency
>> checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a
>> "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
> IIUC, the "freepointer" can be checked on the free path only when
> it's outside the object memory. Here slab_free_hook() zeroed the
> freepointer and caused the problem.
>
> But why we should zero the memory outside the object_size? It seems
> more reasonable to only zero the object_size when init_on_free is set?
The original purpose was to avoid leaking information through the object
and its metadata / tracking information as described in init_on_free
initial Commit 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1
and init_on_free=1 boot options").
I have to admit I didn't read the entire lore about the original
patchset yet, though it could be interesting to know a bit more the
threat models, specifically regarding the object metadata init.
The patch could also be optimized a bit by restricting set_freepointer()
call to the `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` option value.
Thanks again, Nicolas
>
> Thanks.
>
>> Object's freepointer thus needs to be properly set using
>> set_freepointer() after init_on_free.
>>
>> To reproduce, set `slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7` on the
>> command line of a kernel build with `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y`.
>>
>> dmesg sample log:
>> [ 10.708715] =============================================================================
>> [ 10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G B T ): Freepointer corrupt
>> [ 10.712695] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> [ 10.712695]
>> [ 10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
>> [ 10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
>> [ 10.716698]
>> [ 10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00 00 ....
>> [ 10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600 not freed
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet<nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>> ---
>> mm/slub.c | 8 +++++++-
>> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
>> index 3aa12b9b323d9..71dbff9ad8f17 100644
>> --- a/mm/slub.c
>> +++ b/mm/slub.c
>> @@ -4342,10 +4342,16 @@ static __fastpath_inline
>> void slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, void *object,
>> unsigned long addr)
>> {
>> + bool init = false;
>> +
>> memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1);
>> + init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
>>
>> - if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s))))
>> + if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init))) {
>> + if (init)
>> + set_freepointer(s, object, NULL);
>> do_slab_free(s, slab, object, object, 1, addr);
>> + }
>> }
>>
>> static __fastpath_inline
[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 5229 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-25 15:02 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
@ 2024-04-25 15:14 ` Chengming Zhou
2024-04-29 8:52 ` Vlastimil Babka
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Chengming Zhou @ 2024-04-25 15:14 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Nicolas Bouchinet, linux-mm, linux-kernel
Cc: cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim, akpm, vbabka,
roman.gushchin, 42.hyeyoo
On 2024/4/25 23:02, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
> Hy,
>
> First of all, thanks a lot for your time.
>
> On 4/25/24 10:36, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>> On 2024/4/24 20:47, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>> From: Nicolas Bouchinet<nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>>>
>>> Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
>>> separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions
>>> slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call
>>> slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
>> Right.
>>
>>> If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object.
>>> Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are
>>> set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency
>>> checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a
>>> "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
>> IIUC, the "freepointer" can be checked on the free path only when
>> it's outside the object memory. Here slab_free_hook() zeroed the
>> freepointer and caused the problem.
>>
>> But why we should zero the memory outside the object_size? It seems
>> more reasonable to only zero the object_size when init_on_free is set?
>
> The original purpose was to avoid leaking information through the object and its metadata / tracking information as described in init_on_free initial Commit 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options").
>
> I have to admit I didn't read the entire lore about the original patchset yet, though it could be interesting to know a bit more the threat models, specifically regarding the object metadata init.
Thank you for the reference! I also don't get why it needs to zero
the metadata and tracking information.
>
> The patch could also be optimized a bit by restricting set_freepointer() call to the `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` option value.
>
Yeah. Maybe memcg_alloc_abort_single() needs this too.
Thanks.
> Thanks again, Nicolas
>
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>>> Object's freepointer thus needs to be properly set using
>>> set_freepointer() after init_on_free.
>>>
>>> To reproduce, set `slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7` on the
>>> command line of a kernel build with `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y`.
>>>
>>> dmesg sample log:
>>> [ 10.708715] =============================================================================
>>> [ 10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G B T ): Freepointer corrupt
>>> [ 10.712695] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> [ 10.712695]
>>> [ 10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
>>> [ 10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
>>> [ 10.716698]
>>> [ 10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00 00 ....
>>> [ 10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600 not freed
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet<nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>>> ---
>>> mm/slub.c | 8 +++++++-
>>> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
>>> index 3aa12b9b323d9..71dbff9ad8f17 100644
>>> --- a/mm/slub.c
>>> +++ b/mm/slub.c
>>> @@ -4342,10 +4342,16 @@ static __fastpath_inline
>>> void slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, void *object,
>>> unsigned long addr)
>>> {
>>> + bool init = false;
>>> +
>>> memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1);
>>> + init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
>>> - if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s))))
>>> + if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init))) {
>>> + if (init)
>>> + set_freepointer(s, object, NULL);
>>> do_slab_free(s, slab, object, object, 1, addr);
>>> + }
>>> }
>>> static __fastpath_inline
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-24 12:47 [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-25 8:36 ` Chengming Zhou
@ 2024-04-26 9:20 ` Xiongwei Song
2024-04-26 12:18 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
1 sibling, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Xiongwei Song @ 2024-04-26 9:20 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Nicolas Bouchinet
Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim,
akpm, vbabka, roman.gushchin, 42.hyeyoo
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 8:48 PM Nicolas Bouchinet
<nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> wrote:
>
> From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>
> Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
> separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions
> slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call
> slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
>
> If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object.
> Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are
> set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency
> checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a
> "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
>
> Object's freepointer thus needs to be properly set using
> set_freepointer() after init_on_free.
>
> To reproduce, set `slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7` on the
> command line of a kernel build with `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y`.
>
> dmesg sample log:
> [ 10.708715] =============================================================================
> [ 10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G B T ): Freepointer corrupt
> [ 10.712695] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> [ 10.712695]
> [ 10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
> [ 10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
If init_on_free is set, slab_free_hook() zeros the object first, then
do_slab_free() calls
set_freepointer() to set the fp value, so there are 8 bytes non-zero
at the moment?
Hence, the issue is not related to init_on_free?
The fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c here is beyond kernel memory space, is the issue from
CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED enabled?
Thanks,
Xiongwei
> [ 10.716698]
> [ 10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00 00 ....
> [ 10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600 not freed
>
> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
> ---
> mm/slub.c | 8 +++++++-
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index 3aa12b9b323d9..71dbff9ad8f17 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -4342,10 +4342,16 @@ static __fastpath_inline
> void slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, void *object,
> unsigned long addr)
> {
> + bool init = false;
> +
> memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1);
> + init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
>
> - if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s))))
> + if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init))) {
> + if (init)
> + set_freepointer(s, object, NULL);
> do_slab_free(s, slab, object, object, 1, addr);
> + }
> }
>
> static __fastpath_inline
> --
> 2.44.0
>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-26 9:20 ` Xiongwei Song
@ 2024-04-26 12:18 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-26 13:14 ` Xiongwei Song
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Nicolas Bouchinet @ 2024-04-26 12:18 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Xiongwei Song
Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim,
akpm, vbabka, roman.gushchin, 42.hyeyoo
On 4/26/24 11:20, Xiongwei Song wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 8:48 PM Nicolas Bouchinet
> <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> wrote:
>> From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>>
>> Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
>> separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions
>> slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call
>> slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
>>
>> If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object.
>> Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are
>> set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency
>> checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a
>> "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
>>
>> Object's freepointer thus needs to be properly set using
>> set_freepointer() after init_on_free.
>>
>> To reproduce, set `slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7` on the
>> command line of a kernel build with `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y`.
>>
>> dmesg sample log:
>> [ 10.708715] =============================================================================
>> [ 10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G B T ): Freepointer corrupt
>> [ 10.712695] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> [ 10.712695]
>> [ 10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
>> [ 10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
> If init_on_free is set, slab_free_hook() zeros the object first, then
> do_slab_free() calls
> set_freepointer() to set the fp value, so there are 8 bytes non-zero
> at the moment?
> Hence, the issue is not related to init_on_free?
>
> The fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c here is beyond kernel memory space, is the issue from
> CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED enabled?
My understanding of the bug is that slab_free_hook() indeed zeroes the
object and its metadata first, then calls do_slab_free() and directly
calls __slab_free(), head an tail parameters being set to the object.
If `slub_debug=F` (SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS) is set, the following call
path can be executed :
free_to_partial_list() ->
free_debug_processing() ->
free_consistency_checks() ->
check_object() ->
check_valid_pointer(get_freepointer())
When check_valid_pointer() is called, its object parameter is first
decoded by get_freepointer(), if CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED is
enabled, zeroed data is then decoded by freelist_ptr_decode() using the
(ptr.v ^ s->random ^ swab(ptr_addr)) operation.
Does that makes sense to you or do you think I'm missing something ?
Best regards,
Nicolas
> Xiongwei
>
>> [ 10.716698]
>> [ 10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00 00 ....
>> [ 10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600 not freed
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>> ---
>> mm/slub.c | 8 +++++++-
>> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
>> index 3aa12b9b323d9..71dbff9ad8f17 100644
>> --- a/mm/slub.c
>> +++ b/mm/slub.c
>> @@ -4342,10 +4342,16 @@ static __fastpath_inline
>> void slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, void *object,
>> unsigned long addr)
>> {
>> + bool init = false;
>> +
>> memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1);
>> + init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
>>
>> - if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s))))
>> + if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init))) {
>> + if (init)
>> + set_freepointer(s, object, NULL);
>> do_slab_free(s, slab, object, object, 1, addr);
>> + }
>> }
>>
>> static __fastpath_inline
>> --
>> 2.44.0
>>
>>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-26 12:18 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
@ 2024-04-26 13:14 ` Xiongwei Song
2024-04-29 7:55 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Xiongwei Song @ 2024-04-26 13:14 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Nicolas Bouchinet
Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim,
akpm, vbabka, roman.gushchin, 42.hyeyoo
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 8:18 PM Nicolas Bouchinet
<nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> wrote:
>
> On 4/26/24 11:20, Xiongwei Song wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 8:48 PM Nicolas Bouchinet
> > <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> wrote:
> >> From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
> >>
> >> Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
> >> separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions
> >> slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call
> >> slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
> >>
> >> If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object.
> >> Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are
> >> set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency
> >> checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a
> >> "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
> >>
> >> Object's freepointer thus needs to be properly set using
> >> set_freepointer() after init_on_free.
> >>
> >> To reproduce, set `slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7` on the
> >> command line of a kernel build with `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y`.
> >>
> >> dmesg sample log:
> >> [ 10.708715] =============================================================================
> >> [ 10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G B T ): Freepointer corrupt
> >> [ 10.712695] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> [ 10.712695]
> >> [ 10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
> >> [ 10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
> > If init_on_free is set, slab_free_hook() zeros the object first, then
> > do_slab_free() calls
> > set_freepointer() to set the fp value, so there are 8 bytes non-zero
> > at the moment?
> > Hence, the issue is not related to init_on_free?
> >
> > The fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c here is beyond kernel memory space, is the issue from
> > CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED enabled?
>
> My understanding of the bug is that slab_free_hook() indeed zeroes the
> object and its metadata first, then calls do_slab_free() and directly
> calls __slab_free(), head an tail parameters being set to the object.
>
> If `slub_debug=F` (SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS) is set, the following call
> path can be executed :
>
> free_to_partial_list() ->
>
> free_debug_processing() ->
>
> free_consistency_checks() ->
>
> check_object() ->
>
> check_valid_pointer(get_freepointer())
I understand the call path. I meant here the freepointer is not ZERO
but an illegal
value( fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c), then check_valid_pointer return 1 with
it's last line
and then check_object() printed out the error message. I'm not sure if I
misunderstood you.
Thank,
Xiongwei
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-26 13:14 ` Xiongwei Song
@ 2024-04-29 7:55 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Nicolas Bouchinet @ 2024-04-29 7:55 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Xiongwei Song
Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim,
akpm, vbabka, roman.gushchin, 42.hyeyoo
On 4/26/24 15:14, Xiongwei Song wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 8:18 PM Nicolas Bouchinet
> <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> wrote:
>> On 4/26/24 11:20, Xiongwei Song wrote:
>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 8:48 PM Nicolas Bouchinet
>>> <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> wrote:
>>>> From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>>>>
>>>> Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
>>>> separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions
>>>> slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call
>>>> slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
>>>>
>>>> If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object.
>>>> Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are
>>>> set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency
>>>> checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a
>>>> "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
>>>>
>>>> Object's freepointer thus needs to be properly set using
>>>> set_freepointer() after init_on_free.
>>>>
>>>> To reproduce, set `slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7` on the
>>>> command line of a kernel build with `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y`.
>>>>
>>>> dmesg sample log:
>>>> [ 10.708715] =============================================================================
>>>> [ 10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G B T ): Freepointer corrupt
>>>> [ 10.712695] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> [ 10.712695]
>>>> [ 10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
>>>> [ 10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
>>> If init_on_free is set, slab_free_hook() zeros the object first, then
>>> do_slab_free() calls
>>> set_freepointer() to set the fp value, so there are 8 bytes non-zero
>>> at the moment?
>>> Hence, the issue is not related to init_on_free?
>>>
>>> The fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c here is beyond kernel memory space, is the issue from
>>> CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED enabled?
>> My understanding of the bug is that slab_free_hook() indeed zeroes the
>> object and its metadata first, then calls do_slab_free() and directly
>> calls __slab_free(), head an tail parameters being set to the object.
>>
>> If `slub_debug=F` (SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS) is set, the following call
>> path can be executed :
>>
>> free_to_partial_list() ->
>>
>> free_debug_processing() ->
>>
>> free_consistency_checks() ->
>>
>> check_object() ->
>>
>> check_valid_pointer(get_freepointer())
> I understand the call path. I meant here the freepointer is not ZERO
> but an illegal
> value( fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c),
Yes this is the reason of this patch. The freepointer is an illegal
value because the memory range where it sits has been overridden by
zeroes, set_freepointer() is never called and thus the freepointer is
never properly set.
The illegal value is obtained after zeroes has been decoded by
get_freepointer()->freelist_ptr_decode().
> then check_valid_pointer return 1 with
> it's last line
> and then check_object() printed out the error message. I'm not sure if I
> misunderstood you.
check_valid_pointer() returns 0 since object < base, the object being
the decoded fp (0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c < 0xffff.* base addr), hence
check_object() returns 0, not 1.
This is why the "Object at 0x%p not freed" slab_fix() is called in
free_debug_processing().
>
> Thank,
> Xiongwei
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-25 15:14 ` Chengming Zhou
@ 2024-04-29 8:52 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-04-29 9:09 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Vlastimil Babka @ 2024-04-29 8:52 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Chengming Zhou, Nicolas Bouchinet, linux-mm, linux-kernel
Cc: cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim, akpm, roman.gushchin,
42.hyeyoo, Xiongwei Song
On 4/25/24 5:14 PM, Chengming Zhou wrote:
> On 2024/4/25 23:02, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
Thanks for finding the bug and the fix!
>> Hy,
>>
>> First of all, thanks a lot for your time.
>>
>> On 4/25/24 10:36, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>> On 2024/4/24 20:47, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>> From: Nicolas Bouchinet<nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>>>>
>>>> Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
>>>> separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions
>>>> slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call
>>>> slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
>>> Right.
>>>
>>>> If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object.
>>>> Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are
>>>> set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency
>>>> checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a
>>>> "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
>>> IIUC, the "freepointer" can be checked on the free path only when
>>> it's outside the object memory. Here slab_free_hook() zeroed the
>>> freepointer and caused the problem.
>>>
>>> But why we should zero the memory outside the object_size? It seems
>>> more reasonable to only zero the object_size when init_on_free is set?
>>
>> The original purpose was to avoid leaking information through the object and its metadata / tracking information as described in init_on_free initial Commit 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options").
>>
>> I have to admit I didn't read the entire lore about the original patchset yet, though it could be interesting to know a bit more the threat models, specifically regarding the object metadata init.
>
> Thank you for the reference! I also don't get why it needs to zero
> the metadata and tracking information.
Hmm taking a step back, it seems really suboptimal to initialize the
outside-object freepointer as part of init_on_free:
- the freeing itself will always set it one way or another, in this case
free_to_partial_list() will do set_freepointer() after free_debug_processing()
- we lose the ability to detect if the allocated slab object's user wrote to
it, which is a buffer overflow
So the best option to me would be to adjust the init in slab_free_hook() to
avoid the outside-object freepointer similarly to how it avoids the red zone.
We'll still not have the buffer overflow detection ability for bulk free
where slab_free_freelist_hook() will set the free pointer before we reach
the checks, but changing that is most likely not worth the trouble, and
especially not suitable for a stable-candidate fix we need here.
>>
>> The patch could also be optimized a bit by restricting set_freepointer() call to the `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` option value.
>>
>
> Yeah. Maybe memcg_alloc_abort_single() needs this too.
>
> Thanks.
>
>> Thanks again, Nicolas
>>
>>>
>>> Thanks.
>>>
>>>> Object's freepointer thus needs to be properly set using
>>>> set_freepointer() after init_on_free.
>>>>
>>>> To reproduce, set `slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7` on the
>>>> command line of a kernel build with `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y`.
>>>>
>>>> dmesg sample log:
>>>> [ 10.708715] =============================================================================
>>>> [ 10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G B T ): Freepointer corrupt
>>>> [ 10.712695] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> [ 10.712695]
>>>> [ 10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
>>>> [ 10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
>>>> [ 10.716698]
>>>> [ 10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>>> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>>> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>>> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>>> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00 00 ....
>>>> [ 10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600 not freed
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet<nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>>>> ---
>>>> mm/slub.c | 8 +++++++-
>>>> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
>>>> index 3aa12b9b323d9..71dbff9ad8f17 100644
>>>> --- a/mm/slub.c
>>>> +++ b/mm/slub.c
>>>> @@ -4342,10 +4342,16 @@ static __fastpath_inline
>>>> void slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, void *object,
>>>> unsigned long addr)
>>>> {
>>>> + bool init = false;
>>>> +
>>>> memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1);
>>>> + init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
>>>> - if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s))))
>>>> + if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init))) {
>>>> + if (init)
>>>> + set_freepointer(s, object, NULL);
>>>> do_slab_free(s, slab, object, object, 1, addr);
>>>> + }
>>>> }
>>>> static __fastpath_inline
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-29 8:52 ` Vlastimil Babka
@ 2024-04-29 9:09 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-29 12:59 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Nicolas Bouchinet @ 2024-04-29 9:09 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Vlastimil Babka, Chengming Zhou, linux-mm, linux-kernel
Cc: cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim, akpm, roman.gushchin,
42.hyeyoo, Xiongwei Song
Hi Vlastimil,
thanks for your review and your proposal.
On 4/29/24 10:52, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> On 4/25/24 5:14 PM, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>> On 2024/4/25 23:02, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
> Thanks for finding the bug and the fix!
>
>>> Hy,
>>>
>>> First of all, thanks a lot for your time.
>>>
>>> On 4/25/24 10:36, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>>> On 2024/4/24 20:47, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>>> From: Nicolas Bouchinet<nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>>>>>
>>>>> Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
>>>>> separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions
>>>>> slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call
>>>>> slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
>>>> Right.
>>>> y not suitable for a stable-candidate fix we need
>>>>> If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object.
>>>>> Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are
>>>>> set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency
>>>>> checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a
>>>>> "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
>>>> IIUC, the "freepointer" can be checked on the free path only when
>>>> it's outside the object memory. Here slab_free_hook() zeroed the
>>>> freepointer and caused the problem.
>>>>
>>>> But why we should zero the memory outside the object_size? It seems
>>>> more reasonable to only zero the object_size when init_on_free is set?
>>> The original purpose was to avoid leaking information through the object and its metadata / tracking information as described in init_on_free initial Commit 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options").
>>>
>>> I have to admit I didn't read the entire lore about the original patchset yet, though it could be interesting to know a bit more the threat models, specifically regarding the object metadata init.
>> Thank you for the reference! I also don't get why it needs to zero
>> the metadata and tracking information.
> Hmm taking a step back, it seems really suboptimal to initialize the
> outside-object freepointer as part of init_on_free:
>
> - the freeing itself will always set it one way or another, in this case
> free_to_partial_list() will do set_freepointer() after free_debug_processing()
>
> - we lose the ability to detect if the allocated slab object's user wrote to
> it, which is a buffer overflow
>
> So the best option to me would be to adjust the init in slab_free_hook() to
> avoid the outside-object freepointer similarly to how it avoids the red zone.
>
> We'll still not have the buffer overflow detection ability for bulk free
> where slab_free_freelist_hook() will set the free pointer before we reach
> the checks, but changing that is most likely not worth the trouble, and
> especially not suitable for a stable-candidate fix we need here.
It seems like a good alternative to me, I'll push a V2 patch with those
changes.
I help maintaining the Linux-Hardened patchset in which we have a slab
object canary feature that helps detecting overflows. It is located just
after the object freepointer.
>
>>> The patch could also be optimized a bit by restricting set_freepointer() call to the `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` option value.
>>>
>> Yeah. Maybe memcg_alloc_abort_single() needs this too.
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>>> Thanks again, Nicolas
>>>
>>>> Thanks.
>>>>
>>>>> Object's freepointer thus needs to be properly set using
>>>>> set_freepointer() after init_on_free.
>>>>>
>>>>> To reproduce, set `slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7` on the
>>>>> command line of a kernel build with `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y`.
>>>>>
>>>>> dmesg sample log:
>>>>> [ 10.708715] =============================================================================
>>>>> [ 10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G B T ): Freepointer corrupt
>>>>> [ 10.712695] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> [ 10.712695]
>>>>> [ 10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4 fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80 flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
>>>>> [ 10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536 fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
>>>>> [ 10.716698]
>>>>> [ 10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>>>> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>>>> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>>>> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>>>> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00 00 ....
>>>>> [ 10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at 0xffff9d9a80356600 not freed
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet<nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> mm/slub.c | 8 +++++++-
>>>>> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
>>>>> index 3aa12b9b323d9..71dbff9ad8f17 100644
>>>>> --- a/mm/slub.c
>>>>> +++ b/mm/slub.c
>>>>> @@ -4342,10 +4342,16 @@ static __fastpath_inline
>>>>> void slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, void *object,
>>>>> unsigned long addr)
>>>>> {
>>>>> + bool init = false;
>>>>> +
>>>>> memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1);
>>>>> + init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
>>>>> - if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s))))
>>>>> + if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init))) {
>>>>> + if (init)
>>>>> + set_freepointer(s, object, NULL);
>>>>> do_slab_free(s, slab, object, object, 1, addr);
>>>>> + }
>>>>> }
>>>>> static __fastpath_inline
Thanks again for your review,
Nicolas
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-29 9:09 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
@ 2024-04-29 12:59 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-29 13:35 ` Chengming Zhou
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Nicolas Bouchinet @ 2024-04-29 12:59 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Vlastimil Babka, Chengming Zhou, linux-mm, linux-kernel
Cc: cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim, akpm, roman.gushchin,
42.hyeyoo, Xiongwei Song
On 4/29/24 11:09, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
> Hi Vlastimil,
>
> thanks for your review and your proposal.
>
> On 4/29/24 10:52, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
>> On 4/25/24 5:14 PM, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>> On 2024/4/25 23:02, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>> Thanks for finding the bug and the fix!
>>
>>>> Hy,
>>>>
>>>> First of all, thanks a lot for your time.
>>>>
>>>> On 4/25/24 10:36, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>>>> On 2024/4/24 20:47, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>>>> From: Nicolas Bouchinet<nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
>>>>>> separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions
>>>>>> slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call
>>>>>> slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
>>>>> Right.
>>>>> y not suitable for a stable-candidate fix we need
>>>>>> If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object.
>>>>>> Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are
>>>>>> set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency
>>>>>> checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a
>>>>>> "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
>>>>> IIUC, the "freepointer" can be checked on the free path only when
>>>>> it's outside the object memory. Here slab_free_hook() zeroed the
>>>>> freepointer and caused the problem.
>>>>>
>>>>> But why we should zero the memory outside the object_size? It seems
>>>>> more reasonable to only zero the object_size when init_on_free is
>>>>> set?
>>>> The original purpose was to avoid leaking information through the
>>>> object and its metadata / tracking information as described in
>>>> init_on_free initial Commit 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce
>>>> init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options").
>>>>
>>>> I have to admit I didn't read the entire lore about the original
>>>> patchset yet, though it could be interesting to know a bit more the
>>>> threat models, specifically regarding the object metadata init.
>>> Thank you for the reference! I also don't get why it needs to zero
>>> the metadata and tracking information.
>> Hmm taking a step back, it seems really suboptimal to initialize the
>> outside-object freepointer as part of init_on_free:
>>
>> - the freeing itself will always set it one way or another, in this case
>> free_to_partial_list() will do set_freepointer() after
>> free_debug_processing()
>>
>> - we lose the ability to detect if the allocated slab object's user
>> wrote to
>> it, which is a buffer overflow
>>
>> So the best option to me would be to adjust the init in
>> slab_free_hook() to
>> avoid the outside-object freepointer similarly to how it avoids the
>> red zone.
>>
>> We'll still not have the buffer overflow detection ability for bulk free
>> where slab_free_freelist_hook() will set the free pointer before we
>> reach
>> the checks, but changing that is most likely not worth the trouble, and
>> especially not suitable for a stable-candidate fix we need here.
>
> It seems like a good alternative to me, I'll push a V2 patch with
> those changes.
>
> I help maintaining the Linux-Hardened patchset in which we have a slab
> object canary feature that helps detecting overflows. It is located
> just after the object freepointer.
I've tried a patch where the freepointer is avoided but it results in
the same bug. It seems that the commit 0f181f9fbea8bc7ea ("mm/slub.c:
init_on_free=1 should wipe freelist ptr for bulk allocations") inits the
freepointer on allocation if init_on_free is set in order to return a
clean initialized object to the caller.
>
>>
>>>> The patch could also be optimized a bit by restricting
>>>> set_freepointer() call to the `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED`
>>>> option value.
>>>>
>>> Yeah. Maybe memcg_alloc_abort_single() needs this too.
>>>
>>> Thanks.
>>>
>>>> Thanks again, Nicolas
>>>>
>>>>> Thanks.
>>>>>
>>>>>> Object's freepointer thus needs to be properly set using
>>>>>> set_freepointer() after init_on_free.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To reproduce, set `slub_debug=FU init_on_free=1 log_level=7` on the
>>>>>> command line of a kernel build with
>>>>>> `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y`.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> dmesg sample log:
>>>>>> [ 10.708715]
>>>>>> =============================================================================
>>>>>> [ 10.710323] BUG kmalloc-rnd-05-32 (Tainted: G B T ):
>>>>>> Freepointer corrupt
>>>>>> [ 10.712695]
>>>>>> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> [ 10.712695]
>>>>>> [ 10.712695] Slab 0xffffd8bdc400d580 objects=32 used=4
>>>>>> fp=0xffff9d9a80356f80
>>>>>> flags=0x200000000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=2)
>>>>>> [ 10.716698] Object 0xffff9d9a80356600 @offset=1536
>>>>>> fp=0x7ee4f480ce0ecd7c
>>>>>> [ 10.716698]
>>>>>> [ 10.716698] Bytes b4 ffff9d9a803565f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>>>>>> 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>>>>> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>>>>>> 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>>>>> [ 10.720703] Object ffff9d9a80356610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>>>>>> 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>>>>> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035666c: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>>>>>> 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>>>>> [ 10.724696] Padding ffff9d9a8035667c: 00 00 00
>>>>>> 00 ....
>>>>>> [ 10.724696] FIX kmalloc-rnd-05-32: Object at
>>>>>> 0xffff9d9a80356600 not freed
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet<nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>> mm/slub.c | 8 +++++++-
>>>>>> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
>>>>>> index 3aa12b9b323d9..71dbff9ad8f17 100644
>>>>>> --- a/mm/slub.c
>>>>>> +++ b/mm/slub.c
>>>>>> @@ -4342,10 +4342,16 @@ static __fastpath_inline
>>>>>> void slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, void
>>>>>> *object,
>>>>>> unsigned long addr)
>>>>>> {
>>>>>> + bool init = false;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1);
>>>>>> + init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
>>>>>> - if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object,
>>>>>> slab_want_init_on_free(s))))
>>>>>> + if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init))) {
>>>>>> + if (init)
>>>>>> + set_freepointer(s, object, NULL);
>>>>>> do_slab_free(s, slab, object, object, 1, addr);
>>>>>> + }
>>>>>> }
>>>>>> static __fastpath_inline
> Thanks again for your review,
>
> Nicolas
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-29 12:59 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
@ 2024-04-29 13:35 ` Chengming Zhou
2024-04-29 14:32 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Chengming Zhou @ 2024-04-29 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Nicolas Bouchinet, Vlastimil Babka, linux-mm, linux-kernel
Cc: cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim, akpm, roman.gushchin,
42.hyeyoo, Xiongwei Song
On 2024/4/29 20:59, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>
> On 4/29/24 11:09, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>> Hi Vlastimil,
>>
>> thanks for your review and your proposal.
>>
>> On 4/29/24 10:52, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
>>> On 4/25/24 5:14 PM, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>>> On 2024/4/25 23:02, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>> Thanks for finding the bug and the fix!
>>>
>>>>> Hy,
>>>>>
>>>>> First of all, thanks a lot for your time.
>>>>>
>>>>> On 4/25/24 10:36, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024/4/24 20:47, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>>>>> From: Nicolas Bouchinet<nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
>>>>>>> separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions
>>>>>>> slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call
>>>>>>> slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
>>>>>> Right.
>>>>>> y not suitable for a stable-candidate fix we need
>>>>>>> If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object.
>>>>>>> Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are
>>>>>>> set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency
>>>>>>> checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a
>>>>>>> "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
>>>>>> IIUC, the "freepointer" can be checked on the free path only when
>>>>>> it's outside the object memory. Here slab_free_hook() zeroed the
>>>>>> freepointer and caused the problem.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But why we should zero the memory outside the object_size? It seems
>>>>>> more reasonable to only zero the object_size when init_on_free is set?
>>>>> The original purpose was to avoid leaking information through the object and its metadata / tracking information as described in init_on_free initial Commit 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options").
>>>>>
>>>>> I have to admit I didn't read the entire lore about the original patchset yet, though it could be interesting to know a bit more the threat models, specifically regarding the object metadata init.
>>>> Thank you for the reference! I also don't get why it needs to zero
>>>> the metadata and tracking information.
>>> Hmm taking a step back, it seems really suboptimal to initialize the
>>> outside-object freepointer as part of init_on_free:
>>>
>>> - the freeing itself will always set it one way or another, in this case
>>> free_to_partial_list() will do set_freepointer() after free_debug_processing()
>>>
>>> - we lose the ability to detect if the allocated slab object's user wrote to
>>> it, which is a buffer overflow
Ah, right, this ability seems important for debugging overflow problem.
>>>
>>> So the best option to me would be to adjust the init in slab_free_hook() to
>>> avoid the outside-object freepointer similarly to how it avoids the red zone.
Agree.
>>>
>>> We'll still not have the buffer overflow detection ability for bulk free
>>> where slab_free_freelist_hook() will set the free pointer before we reach
>>> the checks, but changing that is most likely not worth the trouble, and
>>> especially not suitable for a stable-candidate fix we need here.
>>
>> It seems like a good alternative to me, I'll push a V2 patch with those changes.
>>
>> I help maintaining the Linux-Hardened patchset in which we have a slab object canary feature that helps detecting overflows. It is located just after the object freepointer.
>
>
> I've tried a patch where the freepointer is avoided but it results in the same bug. It seems that the commit 0f181f9fbea8bc7ea ("mm/slub.c: init_on_free=1 should wipe freelist ptr for bulk allocations") inits the freepointer on allocation if init_on_free is set in order to return a clean initialized object to the caller.
>
Good catch! You may need to change maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr() too,
I haven't tested this, not sure whether it works for you. :)
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 3e33ff900d35..3f250a167cb5 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -3796,7 +3796,8 @@ static void *__slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
static __always_inline void maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(struct kmem_cache *s,
void *obj)
{
- if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj)
+ if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj &&
+ !freeptr_outside_object(s))
memset((void *)((char *)kasan_reset_tag(obj) + s->offset),
0, sizeof(void *));
}
Thanks!
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-29 13:35 ` Chengming Zhou
@ 2024-04-29 14:32 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-29 14:52 ` Chengming Zhou
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Nicolas Bouchinet @ 2024-04-29 14:32 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Chengming Zhou, Vlastimil Babka, linux-mm, linux-kernel
Cc: cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim, akpm, roman.gushchin,
42.hyeyoo, Xiongwei Song
On 4/29/24 15:35, Chengming Zhou wrote:
> On 2024/4/29 20:59, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>> On 4/29/24 11:09, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>> Hi Vlastimil,
>>>
>>> thanks for your review and your proposal.
>>>
>>> On 4/29/24 10:52, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
>>>> On 4/25/24 5:14 PM, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>>>> On 2024/4/25 23:02, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>> Thanks for finding the bug and the fix!
>>>>
>>>>>> Hy,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> First of all, thanks a lot for your time.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/25/24 10:36, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024/4/24 20:47, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>>>>>> From: Nicolas Bouchinet<nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
>>>>>>>> separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions
>>>>>>>> slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call
>>>>>>>> slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
>>>>>>> Right.
>>>>>>> y not suitable for a stable-candidate fix we need
>>>>>>>> If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object.
>>>>>>>> Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are
>>>>>>>> set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency
>>>>>>>> checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a
>>>>>>>> "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
>>>>>>> IIUC, the "freepointer" can be checked on the free path only when
>>>>>>> it's outside the object memory. Here slab_free_hook() zeroed the
>>>>>>> freepointer and caused the problem.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But why we should zero the memory outside the object_size? It seems
>>>>>>> more reasonable to only zero the object_size when init_on_free is set?
>>>>>> The original purpose was to avoid leaking information through the object and its metadata / tracking information as described in init_on_free initial Commit 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options").
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have to admit I didn't read the entire lore about the original patchset yet, though it could be interesting to know a bit more the threat models, specifically regarding the object metadata init.
>>>>> Thank you for the reference! I also don't get why it needs to zero
>>>>> the metadata and tracking information.
>>>> Hmm taking a step back, it seems really suboptimal to initialize the
>>>> outside-object freepointer as part of init_on_free:
>>>>
>>>> - the freeing itself will always set it one way or another, in this case
>>>> free_to_partial_list() will do set_freepointer() after free_debug_processing()
>>>>
>>>> - we lose the ability to detect if the allocated slab object's user wrote to
>>>> it, which is a buffer overflow
> Ah, right, this ability seems important for debugging overflow problem.
>
>>>> So the best option to me would be to adjust the init in slab_free_hook() to
>>>> avoid the outside-object freepointer similarly to how it avoids the red zone.
> Agree.
>
>>>> We'll still not have the buffer overflow detection ability for bulk free
>>>> where slab_free_freelist_hook() will set the free pointer before we reach
>>>> the checks, but changing that is most likely not worth the trouble, and
>>>> especially not suitable for a stable-candidate fix we need here.
>>> It seems like a good alternative to me, I'll push a V2 patch with those changes.
>>>
>>> I help maintaining the Linux-Hardened patchset in which we have a slab object canary feature that helps detecting overflows. It is located just after the object freepointer.
>>
>> I've tried a patch where the freepointer is avoided but it results in the same bug. It seems that the commit 0f181f9fbea8bc7ea ("mm/slub.c: init_on_free=1 should wipe freelist ptr for bulk allocations") inits the freepointer on allocation if init_on_free is set in order to return a clean initialized object to the caller.
>>
> Good catch! You may need to change maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr() too,
> I haven't tested this, not sure whether it works for you. :)
>
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index 3e33ff900d35..3f250a167cb5 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -3796,7 +3796,8 @@ static void *__slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
> static __always_inline void maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(struct kmem_cache *s,
> void *obj)
> {
> - if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj)
> + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj &&
> + !freeptr_outside_object(s))
> memset((void *)((char *)kasan_reset_tag(obj) + s->offset),
> 0, sizeof(void *));
> }
>
> Thanks!
Indeed since check_object() avoids objects for which freepointer is in
the object and since val is equal to SLUB_RED_ACTIVE in our specific
case it should work. Do you want me to add you as Co-authored ?
Best regards,
Nicolas
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-29 14:32 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
@ 2024-04-29 14:52 ` Chengming Zhou
2024-04-29 16:16 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Chengming Zhou @ 2024-04-29 14:52 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Nicolas Bouchinet, Vlastimil Babka, linux-mm, linux-kernel
Cc: cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim, akpm, roman.gushchin,
42.hyeyoo, Xiongwei Song
On 2024/4/29 22:32, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>
> On 4/29/24 15:35, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>> On 2024/4/29 20:59, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>> On 4/29/24 11:09, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>> Hi Vlastimil,
>>>>
>>>> thanks for your review and your proposal.
>>>>
>>>> On 4/29/24 10:52, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
>>>>> On 4/25/24 5:14 PM, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024/4/25 23:02, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>>> Thanks for finding the bug and the fix!
>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hy,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> First of all, thanks a lot for your time.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/25/24 10:36, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2024/4/24 20:47, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>>>>>>> From: Nicolas Bouchinet<nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
>>>>>>>>> separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions
>>>>>>>>> slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call
>>>>>>>>> slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
>>>>>>>> Right.
>>>>>>>> y not suitable for a stable-candidate fix we need
>>>>>>>>> If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object.
>>>>>>>>> Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are
>>>>>>>>> set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency
>>>>>>>>> checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a
>>>>>>>>> "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
>>>>>>>> IIUC, the "freepointer" can be checked on the free path only when
>>>>>>>> it's outside the object memory. Here slab_free_hook() zeroed the
>>>>>>>> freepointer and caused the problem.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But why we should zero the memory outside the object_size? It seems
>>>>>>>> more reasonable to only zero the object_size when init_on_free is set?
>>>>>>> The original purpose was to avoid leaking information through the object and its metadata / tracking information as described in init_on_free initial Commit 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options").
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I have to admit I didn't read the entire lore about the original patchset yet, though it could be interesting to know a bit more the threat models, specifically regarding the object metadata init.
>>>>>> Thank you for the reference! I also don't get why it needs to zero
>>>>>> the metadata and tracking information.
>>>>> Hmm taking a step back, it seems really suboptimal to initialize the
>>>>> outside-object freepointer as part of init_on_free:
>>>>>
>>>>> - the freeing itself will always set it one way or another, in this case
>>>>> free_to_partial_list() will do set_freepointer() after free_debug_processing()
>>>>>
>>>>> - we lose the ability to detect if the allocated slab object's user wrote to
>>>>> it, which is a buffer overflow
>> Ah, right, this ability seems important for debugging overflow problem.
>>
>>>>> So the best option to me would be to adjust the init in slab_free_hook() to
>>>>> avoid the outside-object freepointer similarly to how it avoids the red zone.
>> Agree.
>>
>>>>> We'll still not have the buffer overflow detection ability for bulk free
>>>>> where slab_free_freelist_hook() will set the free pointer before we reach
>>>>> the checks, but changing that is most likely not worth the trouble, and
>>>>> especially not suitable for a stable-candidate fix we need here.
>>>> It seems like a good alternative to me, I'll push a V2 patch with those changes.
>>>>
>>>> I help maintaining the Linux-Hardened patchset in which we have a slab object canary feature that helps detecting overflows. It is located just after the object freepointer.
>>>
>>> I've tried a patch where the freepointer is avoided but it results in the same bug. It seems that the commit 0f181f9fbea8bc7ea ("mm/slub.c: init_on_free=1 should wipe freelist ptr for bulk allocations") inits the freepointer on allocation if init_on_free is set in order to return a clean initialized object to the caller.
>>>
>> Good catch! You may need to change maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr() too,
>> I haven't tested this, not sure whether it works for you. :)
>>
>> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
>> index 3e33ff900d35..3f250a167cb5 100644
>> --- a/mm/slub.c
>> +++ b/mm/slub.c
>> @@ -3796,7 +3796,8 @@ static void *__slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
>> static __always_inline void maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(struct kmem_cache *s,
>> void *obj)
>> {
>> - if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj)
>> + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj &&
>> + !freeptr_outside_object(s))
>> memset((void *)((char *)kasan_reset_tag(obj) + s->offset),
>> 0, sizeof(void *));
>> }
>>
>> Thanks!
>
> Indeed since check_object() avoids objects for which freepointer is in the object and since val is equal to SLUB_RED_ACTIVE in our specific case it should work. Do you want me to add you as Co-authored ?
>
Ok, it's great. Thanks!
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-29 14:52 ` Chengming Zhou
@ 2024-04-29 16:16 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-29 20:22 ` Vlastimil Babka
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Nicolas Bouchinet @ 2024-04-29 16:16 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Chengming Zhou, Vlastimil Babka, linux-mm, linux-kernel
Cc: cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim, akpm, roman.gushchin,
42.hyeyoo, Xiongwei Song
On 4/29/24 16:52, Chengming Zhou wrote:
> On 2024/4/29 22:32, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>> On 4/29/24 15:35, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>> On 2024/4/29 20:59, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>> On 4/29/24 11:09, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>>> Hi Vlastimil,
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks for your review and your proposal.
>>>>>
>>>>> On 4/29/24 10:52, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/25/24 5:14 PM, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024/4/25 23:02, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>>>> Thanks for finding the bug and the fix!
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hy,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> First of all, thanks a lot for your time.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 4/25/24 10:36, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2024/4/24 20:47, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> From: Nicolas Bouchinet<nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Commit 284f17ac13fe ("mm/slub: handle bulk and single object freeing
>>>>>>>>>> separately") splits single and bulk object freeing in two functions
>>>>>>>>>> slab_free() and slab_free_bulk() which leads slab_free() to call
>>>>>>>>>> slab_free_hook() directly instead of slab_free_freelist_hook().
>>>>>>>>> Right.
>>>>>>>>> y not suitable for a stable-candidate fix we need
>>>>>>>>>> If `init_on_free` is set, slab_free_hook() zeroes the object.
>>>>>>>>>> Afterward, if `slub_debug=F` and `CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED` are
>>>>>>>>>> set, the do_slab_free() slowpath executes freelist consistency
>>>>>>>>>> checks and try to decode a zeroed freepointer which leads to a
>>>>>>>>>> "Freepointer corrupt" detection in check_object().
>>>>>>>>> IIUC, the "freepointer" can be checked on the free path only when
>>>>>>>>> it's outside the object memory. Here slab_free_hook() zeroed the
>>>>>>>>> freepointer and caused the problem.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But why we should zero the memory outside the object_size? It seems
>>>>>>>>> more reasonable to only zero the object_size when init_on_free is set?
>>>>>>>> The original purpose was to avoid leaking information through the object and its metadata / tracking information as described in init_on_free initial Commit 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options").
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I have to admit I didn't read the entire lore about the original patchset yet, though it could be interesting to know a bit more the threat models, specifically regarding the object metadata init.
>>>>>>> Thank you for the reference! I also don't get why it needs to zero
>>>>>>> the metadata and tracking information.
>>>>>> Hmm taking a step back, it seems really suboptimal to initialize the
>>>>>> outside-object freepointer as part of init_on_free:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - the freeing itself will always set it one way or another, in this case
>>>>>> free_to_partial_list() will do set_freepointer() after free_debug_processing()
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - we lose the ability to detect if the allocated slab object's user wrote to
>>>>>> it, which is a buffer overflow
>>> Ah, right, this ability seems important for debugging overflow problem.
>>>
>>>>>> So the best option to me would be to adjust the init in slab_free_hook() to
>>>>>> avoid the outside-object freepointer similarly to how it avoids the red zone.
>>> Agree.
>>>
>>>>>> We'll still not have the buffer overflow detection ability for bulk free
>>>>>> where slab_free_freelist_hook() will set the free pointer before we reach
>>>>>> the checks, but changing that is most likely not worth the trouble, and
>>>>>> especially not suitable for a stable-candidate fix we need here.
>>>>> It seems like a good alternative to me, I'll push a V2 patch with those changes.
>>>>>
>>>>> I help maintaining the Linux-Hardened patchset in which we have a slab object canary feature that helps detecting overflows. It is located just after the object freepointer.
>>>> I've tried a patch where the freepointer is avoided but it results in the same bug. It seems that the commit 0f181f9fbea8bc7ea ("mm/slub.c: init_on_free=1 should wipe freelist ptr for bulk allocations") inits the freepointer on allocation if init_on_free is set in order to return a clean initialized object to the caller.
>>>>
>>> Good catch! You may need to change maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr() too,
>>> I haven't tested this, not sure whether it works for you. :)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
>>> index 3e33ff900d35..3f250a167cb5 100644
>>> --- a/mm/slub.c
>>> +++ b/mm/slub.c
>>> @@ -3796,7 +3796,8 @@ static void *__slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
>>> static __always_inline void maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(struct kmem_cache *s,
>>> void *obj)
>>> {
>>> - if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj)
>>> + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj &&
>>> + !freeptr_outside_object(s))
>>> memset((void *)((char *)kasan_reset_tag(obj) + s->offset),
>>> 0, sizeof(void *));
>>> }
>>>
>>> Thanks!
>> Indeed since check_object() avoids objects for which freepointer is in the object and since val is equal to SLUB_RED_ACTIVE in our specific case it should work. Do you want me to add you as Co-authored ?
>>
> Ok, it's great. Thanks!
Now I think of it, doesn't it seems a bit odd to only properly
init_on_free object's freepointer only if it's inside the object ? IMHO
it is equally necessary to avoid information leaking about the
freepointer whether it is inside or outside the object.
I think it break the semantic of the commit 0f181f9fbea8bc7ea
("mm/slub.c: init_on_free=1 should wipe freelist ptr for bulk
allocations") ?
Thanks.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-29 16:16 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
@ 2024-04-29 20:22 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-04-30 9:19 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Vlastimil Babka @ 2024-04-29 20:22 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Nicolas Bouchinet, Chengming Zhou, linux-mm, linux-kernel
Cc: cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim, akpm, roman.gushchin,
42.hyeyoo, Xiongwei Song
On 4/29/24 6:16 PM, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
> On 4/29/24 16:52, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>> On 2024/4/29 22:32, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>> On 4/29/24 15:35, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>>> On 2024/4/29 20:59, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I help maintaining the Linux-Hardened patchset in which we have a slab object canary feature that helps detecting overflows. It is located just after the object freepointer.
>>>>> I've tried a patch where the freepointer is avoided but it results in the same bug. It seems that the commit 0f181f9fbea8bc7ea ("mm/slub.c: init_on_free=1 should wipe freelist ptr for bulk allocations") inits the freepointer on allocation if init_on_free is set in order to return a clean initialized object to the caller.
>>>>>
>>>> Good catch! You may need to change maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr() too,
>>>> I haven't tested this, not sure whether it works for you. :)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
>>>> index 3e33ff900d35..3f250a167cb5 100644
>>>> --- a/mm/slub.c
>>>> +++ b/mm/slub.c
>>>> @@ -3796,7 +3796,8 @@ static void *__slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
>>>> static __always_inline void maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(struct kmem_cache *s,
>>>> void *obj)
>>>> {
>>>> - if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj)
>>>> + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj &&
>>>> + !freeptr_outside_object(s))
>>>> memset((void *)((char *)kasan_reset_tag(obj) + s->offset),
>>>> 0, sizeof(void *));
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> Thanks!
>>> Indeed since check_object() avoids objects for which freepointer is in the object and since val is equal to SLUB_RED_ACTIVE in our specific case it should work. Do you want me to add you as Co-authored ?
>>>
>> Ok, it's great. Thanks!
>
> Now I think of it, doesn't it seems a bit odd to only properly
> init_on_free object's freepointer only if it's inside the object ? IMHO
> it is equally necessary to avoid information leaking about the
> freepointer whether it is inside or outside the object.
> I think it break the semantic of the commit 0f181f9fbea8bc7ea
> ("mm/slub.c: init_on_free=1 should wipe freelist ptr for bulk
> allocations") ?
Hm, AFAIU, wiping inside object prevents misuse of some buggy kernel code
that would allocate and accidentally leak prior content (including the
in-object freepointer) somewhere the attacker can read. Now for wiping the
freepointer outside the object to be useful it would have assume said
leak-prone code to additionally be reading past the allocated object size,
i.e. a read buffer overflow. That to me seems to be a much more rare
combination, and also in that case such code could also likely read even
further past the object, i.e. leak the next object's data? IOW I don't think
it buys us much additional security protection in practice?
> Thanks.
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free
2024-04-29 20:22 ` Vlastimil Babka
@ 2024-04-30 9:19 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Nicolas Bouchinet @ 2024-04-30 9:19 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Vlastimil Babka, Chengming Zhou, linux-mm, linux-kernel
Cc: cl, penberg, rientjes, iamjoonsoo.kim, akpm, roman.gushchin,
42.hyeyoo, Xiongwei Song
On 4/29/24 22:22, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> On 4/29/24 6:16 PM, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>> On 4/29/24 16:52, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>> On 2024/4/29 22:32, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>> On 4/29/24 15:35, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>>>>> On 2024/4/29 20:59, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
>>>>>>> I help maintaining the Linux-Hardened patchset in which we have a slab object canary feature that helps detecting overflows. It is located just after the object freepointer.
>>>>>> I've tried a patch where the freepointer is avoided but it results in the same bug. It seems that the commit 0f181f9fbea8bc7ea ("mm/slub.c: init_on_free=1 should wipe freelist ptr for bulk allocations") inits the freepointer on allocation if init_on_free is set in order to return a clean initialized object to the caller.
>>>>>>
>>>>> Good catch! You may need to change maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr() too,
>>>>> I haven't tested this, not sure whether it works for you. :)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
>>>>> index 3e33ff900d35..3f250a167cb5 100644
>>>>> --- a/mm/slub.c
>>>>> +++ b/mm/slub.c
>>>>> @@ -3796,7 +3796,8 @@ static void *__slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
>>>>> static __always_inline void maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(struct kmem_cache *s,
>>>>> void *obj)
>>>>> {
>>>>> - if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj)
>>>>> + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && obj &&
>>>>> + !freeptr_outside_object(s))
>>>>> memset((void *)((char *)kasan_reset_tag(obj) + s->offset),
>>>>> 0, sizeof(void *));
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks!
>>>> Indeed since check_object() avoids objects for which freepointer is in the object and since val is equal to SLUB_RED_ACTIVE in our specific case it should work. Do you want me to add you as Co-authored ?
>>>>
>>> Ok, it's great. Thanks!
>> Now I think of it, doesn't it seems a bit odd to only properly
>> init_on_free object's freepointer only if it's inside the object ? IMHO
>> it is equally necessary to avoid information leaking about the
>> freepointer whether it is inside or outside the object.
>> I think it break the semantic of the commit 0f181f9fbea8bc7ea
>> ("mm/slub.c: init_on_free=1 should wipe freelist ptr for bulk
>> allocations") ?
> Hm, AFAIU, wiping inside object prevents misuse of some buggy kernel code
> that would allocate and accidentally leak prior content (including the
> in-object freepointer) somewhere the attacker can read. Now for wiping the
> freepointer outside the object to be useful it would have assume said
> leak-prone code to additionally be reading past the allocated object size,
> i.e. a read buffer overflow. That to me seems to be a much more rare
> combination, and also in that case such code could also likely read even
> further past the object, i.e. leak the next object's data? IOW I don't think
> it buys us much additional security protection in practice?
>
Moreover, with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED activated, freepointers are
encoded and harder to exploit.
>> Thanks.
>>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2024-04-30 9:20 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2024-04-24 12:47 [PATCH] slub: Fixes freepointer encoding for single free Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-25 8:36 ` Chengming Zhou
2024-04-25 15:02 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-25 15:14 ` Chengming Zhou
2024-04-29 8:52 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-04-29 9:09 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-29 12:59 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-29 13:35 ` Chengming Zhou
2024-04-29 14:32 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-29 14:52 ` Chengming Zhou
2024-04-29 16:16 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-29 20:22 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-04-30 9:19 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-26 9:20 ` Xiongwei Song
2024-04-26 12:18 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-04-26 13:14 ` Xiongwei Song
2024-04-29 7:55 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
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