* [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX
@ 2024-05-07 18:07 Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 1/9] mm: Introduce AS_INACCESSIBLE for encrypted/confidential memory Paolo Bonzini
` (9 more replies)
0 siblings, 10 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2024-05-07 18:07 UTC (permalink / raw
To: linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: vbabka, isaku.yamahata, xiaoyao.li, binbin.wu, seanjc,
rick.p.edgecombe, michael.roth, yilun.xu
This is the hopefully final version of the gmem common API patches,
adding target-independent functionality and hooks that are
needed by SEV-SNP and TDX.
Changes from https://patchew.org/linux/20240404185034.3184582-1-pbonzini@redhat.com/:
- added acks and comments from Vlastimil to patches 1-2
- dropped FGP_CREAT_ONLY, which also means removing kvm_gmem_undo_get_pfn()
in the last patch
- filemap_grab_folio() cannot return NULL
- dropped weak implementation of kvm_arch_gmem_prepare_needed()
- dropped __kvm_gmem_punch_hole()
- introduced kvm_gmem_populate_cb typedef
- renamed argument of kvm_gmem_populate from gfn to start_gfn,
variable from this_gfn to gfn
- post_populate hook is mandatory
- replaced implementation of "KVM: x86: Add hook for determining max NPT
mapping level" with suggestion from SNP series
Contrarily to my answer to Yilun, prepare does not need to test
hwpoison. It's kvm_gmem_populate() that needs it, and in fact
it already does via __kvm_gmem_get_pfn().
Paolo
Michael Roth (4):
mm: Introduce AS_INACCESSIBLE for encrypted/confidential memory
KVM: guest_memfd: Use AS_INACCESSIBLE when creating guest_memfd inode
KVM: guest_memfd: Add hook for invalidating memory
KVM: x86: Add hook for determining max NPT mapping level
Paolo Bonzini (5):
KVM: guest_memfd: pass error up from filemap_grab_folio
KVM: guest_memfd: limit overzealous WARN
KVM: guest_memfd: Add hook for initializing memory
KVM: guest_memfd: extract __kvm_gmem_get_pfn()
KVM: guest_memfd: Add interface for populating gmem pages with user
data
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 3 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 23 +++-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 13 +++
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 36 +++++++
include/linux/pagemap.h | 1 +
mm/truncate.c | 3 +-
virt/kvm/Kconfig | 8 ++
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 167 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
9 files changed, 231 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/9] mm: Introduce AS_INACCESSIBLE for encrypted/confidential memory
2024-05-07 18:07 [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX Paolo Bonzini
@ 2024-05-07 18:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 2/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Use AS_INACCESSIBLE when creating guest_memfd inode Paolo Bonzini
` (8 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2024-05-07 18:07 UTC (permalink / raw
To: linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: vbabka, isaku.yamahata, xiaoyao.li, binbin.wu, seanjc,
rick.p.edgecombe, michael.roth, yilun.xu, Matthew Wilcox,
linux-mm
From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
filemap users like guest_memfd may use page cache pages to
allocate/manage memory that is only intended to be accessed by guests
via hardware protections like encryption. Writes to memory of this sort
in common paths like truncation may cause unexpected behavior such as
writing garbage instead of zeros when attempting to zero pages, or
worse, triggering hardware protections that are considered fatal as far
as the kernel is concerned.
Introduce a new address_space flag, AS_INACCESSIBLE, and use this
initially to prevent zero'ing of pages during truncation, with the
understanding that it is up to the owner of the mapping to handle this
specially if needed.
This is admittedly a rather blunt solution, but it seems like
there are no other places that should take into account the
flag to keep its promise.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZR9LYhpxTaTk6PJX@google.com/
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240329212444.395559-5-michael.roth@amd.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/pagemap.h | 1 +
mm/truncate.c | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/pagemap.h b/include/linux/pagemap.h
index 2df35e65557d..f879c1d54da7 100644
--- a/include/linux/pagemap.h
+++ b/include/linux/pagemap.h
@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ enum mapping_flags {
AS_STABLE_WRITES, /* must wait for writeback before modifying
folio contents */
AS_UNMOVABLE, /* The mapping cannot be moved, ever */
+ AS_INACCESSIBLE, /* Do not attempt direct R/W access to the mapping */
};
/**
diff --git a/mm/truncate.c b/mm/truncate.c
index 725b150e47ac..c501338c7ebd 100644
--- a/mm/truncate.c
+++ b/mm/truncate.c
@@ -233,7 +233,8 @@ bool truncate_inode_partial_folio(struct folio *folio, loff_t start, loff_t end)
* doing a complex calculation here, and then doing the zeroing
* anyway if the page split fails.
*/
- folio_zero_range(folio, offset, length);
+ if (!(folio->mapping->flags & AS_INACCESSIBLE))
+ folio_zero_range(folio, offset, length);
if (folio_has_private(folio))
folio_invalidate(folio, offset, length);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Use AS_INACCESSIBLE when creating guest_memfd inode
2024-05-07 18:07 [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 1/9] mm: Introduce AS_INACCESSIBLE for encrypted/confidential memory Paolo Bonzini
@ 2024-05-07 18:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 3/9] KVM: guest_memfd: pass error up from filemap_grab_folio Paolo Bonzini
` (7 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2024-05-07 18:07 UTC (permalink / raw
To: linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: vbabka, isaku.yamahata, xiaoyao.li, binbin.wu, seanjc,
rick.p.edgecombe, michael.roth, yilun.xu, linux-mm
From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
truncate_inode_pages_range() may attempt to zero pages before truncating
them, and this will occur before arch-specific invalidations can be
triggered via .invalidate_folio/.free_folio hooks via kvm_gmem_aops. For
AMD SEV-SNP this would result in an RMP #PF being generated by the
hardware, which is currently treated as fatal (and even if specifically
allowed for, would not result in anything other than garbage being
written to guest pages due to encryption). On Intel TDX this would also
result in undesirable behavior.
Set the AS_INACCESSIBLE flag to prevent the MM from attempting
unexpected accesses of this sort during operations like truncation.
This may also in some cases yield a decent performance improvement for
guest_memfd userspace implementations that hole-punch ranges immediately
after private->shared conversions via KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES, since
the current implementation of truncate_inode_pages_range() always ends
up zero'ing an entire 4K range if it is backing by a 2M folio.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZR9LYhpxTaTk6PJX@google.com/
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240329212444.395559-6-michael.roth@amd.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index 0f4e0cf4f158..5a929536ecf2 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ static int __kvm_gmem_create(struct kvm *kvm, loff_t size, u64 flags)
inode->i_private = (void *)(unsigned long)flags;
inode->i_op = &kvm_gmem_iops;
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &kvm_gmem_aops;
+ inode->i_mapping->flags |= AS_INACCESSIBLE;
inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
inode->i_size = size;
mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 3/9] KVM: guest_memfd: pass error up from filemap_grab_folio
2024-05-07 18:07 [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 1/9] mm: Introduce AS_INACCESSIBLE for encrypted/confidential memory Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 2/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Use AS_INACCESSIBLE when creating guest_memfd inode Paolo Bonzini
@ 2024-05-07 18:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 4/9] KVM: guest_memfd: limit overzealous WARN Paolo Bonzini
` (6 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2024-05-07 18:07 UTC (permalink / raw
To: linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: vbabka, isaku.yamahata, xiaoyao.li, binbin.wu, seanjc,
rick.p.edgecombe, michael.roth, yilun.xu
Some SNP ioctls will require the page not to be in the pagecache, and as such they
will want to return EEXIST to userspace. Start by passing the error up from
filemap_grab_folio.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index 5a929536ecf2..c27828b0d42d 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ static struct folio *kvm_gmem_get_folio(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index)
/* TODO: Support huge pages. */
folio = filemap_grab_folio(inode->i_mapping, index);
- if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(folio))
- return NULL;
+ if (IS_ERR(folio))
+ return folio;
/*
* Use the up-to-date flag to track whether or not the memory has been
@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ static long kvm_gmem_allocate(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
}
folio = kvm_gmem_get_folio(inode, index);
- if (!folio) {
- r = -ENOMEM;
+ if (IS_ERR(folio)) {
+ r = PTR_ERR(folio);
break;
}
@@ -505,8 +505,8 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
}
folio = kvm_gmem_get_folio(file_inode(file), index);
- if (!folio) {
- r = -ENOMEM;
+ if (IS_ERR(folio)) {
+ r = PTR_ERR(folio);
goto out_fput;
}
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4/9] KVM: guest_memfd: limit overzealous WARN
2024-05-07 18:07 [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX Paolo Bonzini
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 3/9] KVM: guest_memfd: pass error up from filemap_grab_folio Paolo Bonzini
@ 2024-05-07 18:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 5/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Add hook for initializing memory Paolo Bonzini
` (5 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2024-05-07 18:07 UTC (permalink / raw
To: linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: vbabka, isaku.yamahata, xiaoyao.li, binbin.wu, seanjc,
rick.p.edgecombe, michael.roth, yilun.xu
Because kvm_gmem_get_pfn() is called from the page fault path without
any of the slots_lock, filemap lock or mmu_lock taken, it is
possible for it to race with kvm_gmem_unbind(). This is not a
problem, as any PTE that is installed temporarily will be zapped
before the guest has the occasion to run.
However, it is not possible to have a complete unbind+bind
racing with the page fault, because deleting the memslot
will call synchronize_srcu_expedited() and wait for the
page fault to be resolved. Thus, we can still warn if
the file is there and is not the one we expect.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index c27828b0d42d..fd32288d0fbc 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -499,7 +499,8 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
gmem = file->private_data;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(xa_load(&gmem->bindings, index) != slot)) {
+ if (xa_load(&gmem->bindings, index) != slot) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(xa_load(&gmem->bindings, index));
r = -EIO;
goto out_fput;
}
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 5/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Add hook for initializing memory
2024-05-07 18:07 [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX Paolo Bonzini
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 4/9] KVM: guest_memfd: limit overzealous WARN Paolo Bonzini
@ 2024-05-07 18:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 6/9] KVM: guest_memfd: extract __kvm_gmem_get_pfn() Paolo Bonzini
` (4 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2024-05-07 18:07 UTC (permalink / raw
To: linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: vbabka, isaku.yamahata, xiaoyao.li, binbin.wu, seanjc,
rick.p.edgecombe, michael.roth, yilun.xu
guest_memfd pages are generally expected to be in some arch-defined
initial state prior to using them for guest memory. For SEV-SNP this
initial state is 'private', or 'guest-owned', and requires additional
operations to move these pages into a 'private' state by updating the
corresponding entries the RMP table.
Allow for an arch-defined hook to handle updates of this sort, and go
ahead and implement one for x86 so KVM implementations like AMD SVM can
register a kvm_x86_ops callback to handle these updates for SEV-SNP
guests.
The preparation callback is always called when allocating/grabbing
folios via gmem, and it is up to the architecture to keep track of
whether or not the pages are already in the expected state (e.g. the RMP
table in the case of SEV-SNP).
In some cases, it is necessary to defer the preparation of the pages to
handle things like in-place encryption of initial guest memory payloads
before marking these pages as 'private'/'guest-owned'. Add an argument
(always true for now) to kvm_gmem_get_folio() that allows for the
preparation callback to be bypassed. To detect possible issues in
the way userspace initializes memory, it is only possible to add an
unprepared page if it is not already included in the filemap.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZLqVdvsF11Ddo7Dq@google.com/
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20231230172351.574091-5-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 ++++
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 5 +++
virt/kvm/Kconfig | 4 +++
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
6 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index 5187fcf4b610..d26fcad13e36 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons);
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(get_untagged_addr)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(alloc_apic_backing_page)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(gmem_prepare)
#undef KVM_X86_OP
#undef KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 9d6368512be6..5562a2443c5c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1814,6 +1814,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
gva_t (*get_untagged_addr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, unsigned int flags);
void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+ int (*gmem_prepare)(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order);
};
struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 2d2619d3eee4..972524ddcfdb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -13598,6 +13598,12 @@ bool kvm_arch_no_poll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_no_poll);
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_GMEM_PREPARE
+int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, int max_order)
+{
+ return static_call(kvm_x86_gmem_prepare)(kvm, pfn, gfn, max_order);
+}
+#endif
int kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(u64 value)
{
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index afbc99264ffa..1af069ab657c 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -2443,4 +2443,9 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm,
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM */
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_GMEM_PREPARE
+int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, int max_order);
+bool kvm_arch_gmem_prepare_needed(struct kvm *kvm);
+#endif
+
#endif
diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
index 29b73eedfe74..ca870157b2ed 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -109,3 +109,7 @@ config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
select KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
bool
+
+config HAVE_KVM_GMEM_PREPARE
+ bool
+ depends on KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index fd32288d0fbc..0176089be731 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -13,7 +13,43 @@ struct kvm_gmem {
struct list_head entry;
};
-static struct folio *kvm_gmem_get_folio(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index)
+static int kvm_gmem_prepare_folio(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index, struct folio *folio)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_GMEM_PREPARE
+ struct list_head *gmem_list = &inode->i_mapping->i_private_list;
+ struct kvm_gmem *gmem;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(gmem, gmem_list, entry) {
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+ struct kvm *kvm = gmem->kvm;
+ struct page *page;
+ kvm_pfn_t pfn;
+ gfn_t gfn;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!kvm_arch_gmem_prepare_needed(kvm))
+ continue;
+
+ slot = xa_load(&gmem->bindings, index);
+ if (!slot)
+ continue;
+
+ page = folio_file_page(folio, index);
+ pfn = page_to_pfn(page);
+ gfn = slot->base_gfn + index - slot->gmem.pgoff;
+ rc = kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(kvm, gfn, pfn, compound_order(compound_head(page)));
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("gmem: Failed to prepare folio for index %lx, error %d.\n",
+ index, rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct folio *kvm_gmem_get_folio(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index, bool prepare)
{
struct folio *folio;
@@ -41,6 +77,15 @@ static struct folio *kvm_gmem_get_folio(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index)
folio_mark_uptodate(folio);
}
+ if (prepare) {
+ int r = kvm_gmem_prepare_folio(inode, index, folio);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ folio_unlock(folio);
+ folio_put(folio);
+ return ERR_PTR(r);
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* Ignore accessed, referenced, and dirty flags. The memory is
* unevictable and there is no storage to write back to.
@@ -145,7 +190,7 @@ static long kvm_gmem_allocate(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
break;
}
- folio = kvm_gmem_get_folio(inode, index);
+ folio = kvm_gmem_get_folio(inode, index, true);
if (IS_ERR(folio)) {
r = PTR_ERR(folio);
break;
@@ -505,7 +550,7 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
goto out_fput;
}
- folio = kvm_gmem_get_folio(file_inode(file), index);
+ folio = kvm_gmem_get_folio(file_inode(file), index, true);
if (IS_ERR(folio)) {
r = PTR_ERR(folio);
goto out_fput;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 6/9] KVM: guest_memfd: extract __kvm_gmem_get_pfn()
2024-05-07 18:07 [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX Paolo Bonzini
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 5/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Add hook for initializing memory Paolo Bonzini
@ 2024-05-07 18:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 7/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Add interface for populating gmem pages with user data Paolo Bonzini
` (3 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2024-05-07 18:07 UTC (permalink / raw
To: linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: vbabka, isaku.yamahata, xiaoyao.li, binbin.wu, seanjc,
rick.p.edgecombe, michael.roth, yilun.xu
In preparation for adding a function that walks a set of pages
provided by userspace and populates them in a guest_memfd,
add a version of kvm_gmem_get_pfn() that has a "bool prepare"
argument and passes it down to kvm_gmem_get_folio().
Populating guest memory has to call repeatedly __kvm_gmem_get_pfn()
on the same file, so make the new function take struct file*.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index 0176089be731..bfe437098b79 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -528,33 +528,29 @@ void kvm_gmem_unbind(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
fput(file);
}
-int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
- gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t *pfn, int *max_order)
+static int __kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct file *file, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+ gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t *pfn, int *max_order, bool prepare)
{
pgoff_t index = gfn - slot->base_gfn + slot->gmem.pgoff;
- struct kvm_gmem *gmem;
+ struct kvm_gmem *gmem = file->private_data;
struct folio *folio;
struct page *page;
- struct file *file;
int r;
- file = kvm_gmem_get_file(slot);
- if (!file)
+ if (file != slot->gmem.file) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(slot->gmem.file);
return -EFAULT;
+ }
gmem = file->private_data;
-
if (xa_load(&gmem->bindings, index) != slot) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(xa_load(&gmem->bindings, index));
- r = -EIO;
- goto out_fput;
+ return -EIO;
}
- folio = kvm_gmem_get_folio(file_inode(file), index, true);
- if (IS_ERR(folio)) {
- r = PTR_ERR(folio);
- goto out_fput;
- }
+ folio = kvm_gmem_get_folio(file_inode(file), index, prepare);
+ if (IS_ERR(folio))
+ return PTR_ERR(folio);
if (folio_test_hwpoison(folio)) {
r = -EHWPOISON;
@@ -571,9 +567,21 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
out_unlock:
folio_unlock(folio);
-out_fput:
- fput(file);
return r;
}
+
+int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+ gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t *pfn, int *max_order)
+{
+ struct file *file = kvm_gmem_get_file(slot);
+ int r;
+
+ if (!file)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ r = __kvm_gmem_get_pfn(file, slot, gfn, pfn, max_order, true);
+ fput(file);
+ return r;
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gmem_get_pfn);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 7/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Add interface for populating gmem pages with user data
2024-05-07 18:07 [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX Paolo Bonzini
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 6/9] KVM: guest_memfd: extract __kvm_gmem_get_pfn() Paolo Bonzini
@ 2024-05-07 18:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 8/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Add hook for invalidating memory Paolo Bonzini
` (2 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2024-05-07 18:07 UTC (permalink / raw
To: linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: vbabka, isaku.yamahata, xiaoyao.li, binbin.wu, seanjc,
rick.p.edgecombe, michael.roth, yilun.xu
During guest run-time, kvm_arch_gmem_prepare() is issued as needed to
prepare newly-allocated gmem pages prior to mapping them into the guest.
In the case of SEV-SNP, this mainly involves setting the pages to
private in the RMP table.
However, for the GPA ranges comprising the initial guest payload, which
are encrypted/measured prior to starting the guest, the gmem pages need
to be accessed prior to setting them to private in the RMP table so they
can be initialized with the userspace-provided data. Additionally, an
SNP firmware call is needed afterward to encrypt them in-place and
measure the contents into the guest's launch digest.
While it is possible to bypass the kvm_arch_gmem_prepare() hooks so that
this handling can be done in an open-coded/vendor-specific manner, this
may expose more gmem-internal state/dependencies to external callers
than necessary. Try to avoid this by implementing an interface that
tries to handle as much of the common functionality inside gmem as
possible, while also making it generic enough to potentially be
usable/extensible for TDX as well.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 79 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 1af069ab657c..1ae65774d9fa 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -2448,4 +2448,31 @@ int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, int max_ord
bool kvm_arch_gmem_prepare_needed(struct kvm *kvm);
#endif
+/**
+ * kvm_gmem_populate() - Populate/prepare a GPA range with guest data
+ *
+ * @kvm: KVM instance
+ * @gfn: starting GFN to be populated
+ * @src: userspace-provided buffer containing data to copy into GFN range
+ * (passed to @post_populate, and incremented on each iteration
+ * if not NULL)
+ * @npages: number of pages to copy from userspace-buffer
+ * @post_populate: callback to issue for each gmem page that backs the GPA
+ * range
+ * @opaque: opaque data to pass to @post_populate callback
+ *
+ * This is primarily intended for cases where a gmem-backed GPA range needs
+ * to be initialized with userspace-provided data prior to being mapped into
+ * the guest as a private page. This should be called with the slots->lock
+ * held so that caller-enforced invariants regarding the expected memory
+ * attributes of the GPA range do not race with KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES.
+ *
+ * Returns the number of pages that were populated.
+ */
+typedef int (*kvm_gmem_populate_cb)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
+ void __user *src, int order, void *opaque);
+
+long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, void __user *src, long npages,
+ kvm_gmem_populate_cb post_populate, void *opaque);
+
#endif
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index bfe437098b79..5d6c87bb13f6 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -585,3 +585,55 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
return r;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gmem_get_pfn);
+
+long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user *src, long npages,
+ kvm_gmem_populate_cb post_populate, void *opaque)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+ void __user *p;
+
+ int ret = 0, max_order;
+ long i;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->slots_lock);
+ if (npages < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, start_gfn);
+ if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ file = kvm_gmem_get_file(slot);
+ if (!file)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ filemap_invalidate_lock(file->f_mapping);
+
+ npages = min_t(ulong, slot->npages - (start_gfn - slot->base_gfn), npages);
+ for (i = 0; i < npages; i += (1 << max_order)) {
+ gfn_t gfn = start_gfn + i;
+ kvm_pfn_t pfn;
+
+ ret = __kvm_gmem_get_pfn(file, slot, gfn, &pfn, &max_order, false);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(gfn, (1 << max_order)) ||
+ (npages - i) < (1 << max_order))
+ max_order = 0;
+
+ p = src ? src + i * PAGE_SIZE : NULL;
+ ret = post_populate(kvm, gfn, pfn, p, max_order, opaque);
+
+ put_page(pfn_to_page(pfn));
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ filemap_invalidate_unlock(file->f_mapping);
+
+ fput(file);
+ return ret && !i ? ret : i;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gmem_populate);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 8/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Add hook for invalidating memory
2024-05-07 18:07 [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX Paolo Bonzini
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 7/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Add interface for populating gmem pages with user data Paolo Bonzini
@ 2024-05-07 18:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 9/9] KVM: x86: Add hook for determining max NPT mapping level Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-08 0:15 ` [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX Isaku Yamahata
9 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2024-05-07 18:07 UTC (permalink / raw
To: linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: vbabka, isaku.yamahata, xiaoyao.li, binbin.wu, seanjc,
rick.p.edgecombe, michael.roth, yilun.xu
From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
In some cases, like with SEV-SNP, guest memory needs to be updated in a
platform-specific manner before it can be safely freed back to the host.
Wire up arch-defined hooks to the .free_folio kvm_gmem_aops callback to
allow for special handling of this sort when freeing memory in response
to FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE operations and when releasing the inode, and go
ahead and define an arch-specific hook for x86 since it will be needed
for handling memory used for SEV-SNP guests.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20231230172351.574091-6-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 7 +++++++
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 4 ++++
virt/kvm/Kconfig | 4 ++++
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index d26fcad13e36..c81990937ab4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons);
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(get_untagged_addr)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(alloc_apic_backing_page)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(gmem_prepare)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(gmem_invalidate)
#undef KVM_X86_OP
#undef KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 5562a2443c5c..c6c5018376be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1815,6 +1815,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
gva_t (*get_untagged_addr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, unsigned int flags);
void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*gmem_prepare)(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order);
+ void (*gmem_invalidate)(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end);
};
struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 972524ddcfdb..83b8260443a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -13605,6 +13605,13 @@ int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, int max_ord
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_GMEM_INVALIDATE
+void kvm_arch_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end)
+{
+ static_call_cond(kvm_x86_gmem_invalidate)(start, end);
+}
+#endif
+
int kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(u64 value)
{
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 1ae65774d9fa..b43b96f876fe 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -2475,4 +2475,8 @@ typedef int (*kvm_gmem_populate_cb)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, void __user *src, long npages,
kvm_gmem_populate_cb post_populate, void *opaque);
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_GMEM_INVALIDATE
+void kvm_arch_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end);
+#endif
+
#endif
diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
index ca870157b2ed..754c6c923427 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -113,3 +113,7 @@ config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
config HAVE_KVM_GMEM_PREPARE
bool
depends on KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
+
+config HAVE_KVM_GMEM_INVALIDATE
+ bool
+ depends on KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index 5d6c87bb13f6..dfe50c64a552 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -343,10 +343,24 @@ static int kvm_gmem_error_folio(struct address_space *mapping, struct folio *fol
return MF_DELAYED;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_GMEM_INVALIDATE
+static void kvm_gmem_free_folio(struct folio *folio)
+{
+ struct page *page = folio_page(folio, 0);
+ kvm_pfn_t pfn = page_to_pfn(page);
+ int order = folio_order(folio);
+
+ kvm_arch_gmem_invalidate(pfn, pfn + (1ul << order));
+}
+#endif
+
static const struct address_space_operations kvm_gmem_aops = {
.dirty_folio = noop_dirty_folio,
.migrate_folio = kvm_gmem_migrate_folio,
.error_remove_folio = kvm_gmem_error_folio,
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_GMEM_INVALIDATE
+ .free_folio = kvm_gmem_free_folio,
+#endif
};
static int kvm_gmem_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path,
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 9/9] KVM: x86: Add hook for determining max NPT mapping level
2024-05-07 18:07 [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX Paolo Bonzini
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 8/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Add hook for invalidating memory Paolo Bonzini
@ 2024-05-07 18:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-08 0:15 ` [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX Isaku Yamahata
9 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2024-05-07 18:07 UTC (permalink / raw
To: linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: vbabka, isaku.yamahata, xiaoyao.li, binbin.wu, seanjc,
rick.p.edgecombe, michael.roth, yilun.xu
From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
In the case of SEV-SNP, whether or not a 2MB page can be mapped via a
2MB mapping in the guest's nested page table depends on whether or not
any subpages within the range have already been initialized as private
in the RMP table. The existing mixed-attribute tracking in KVM is
insufficient here, for instance:
- gmem allocates 2MB page
- guest issues PVALIDATE on 2MB page
- guest later converts a subpage to shared
- SNP host code issues PSMASH to split 2MB RMP mapping to 4K
- KVM MMU splits NPT mapping to 4K
- guest later converts that shared page back to private
At this point there are no mixed attributes, and KVM would normally
allow for 2MB NPT mappings again, but this is actually not allowed
because the RMP table mappings are 4K and cannot be promoted on the
hypervisor side, so the NPT mappings must still be limited to 4K to
match this.
Add a hook to determine the max NPT mapping size in situations like
this.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240501085210.2213060-3-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index c81990937ab4..566d19b02483 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons);
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(get_untagged_addr)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(alloc_apic_backing_page)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(gmem_prepare)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(private_max_mapping_level)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(gmem_invalidate)
#undef KVM_X86_OP
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index c6c5018376be..87265b73906a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1816,6 +1816,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*gmem_prepare)(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order);
void (*gmem_invalidate)(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end);
+ int (*private_max_mapping_level)(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn);
};
struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 510eb1117012..a5259e070c06 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -4271,6 +4271,25 @@ static inline u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)
return PG_LEVEL_4K;
}
+static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
+ u8 max_level, int gmem_order)
+{
+ u8 req_max_level;
+
+ if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
+ return PG_LEVEL_4K;
+
+ max_level = min(kvm_max_level_for_order(gmem_order), max_level);
+ if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
+ return PG_LEVEL_4K;
+
+ req_max_level = static_call(kvm_x86_private_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn);
+ if (req_max_level)
+ max_level = min(max_level, req_max_level);
+
+ return req_max_level;
+}
+
static int kvm_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
{
@@ -4288,9 +4307,9 @@ static int kvm_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return r;
}
- fault->max_level = min(kvm_max_level_for_order(max_order),
- fault->max_level);
fault->map_writable = !(fault->slot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY);
+ fault->max_level = kvm_max_private_mapping_level(vcpu->kvm, fault->pfn,
+ fault->max_level, max_order);
return RET_PF_CONTINUE;
}
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX
2024-05-07 18:07 [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX Paolo Bonzini
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 9/9] KVM: x86: Add hook for determining max NPT mapping level Paolo Bonzini
@ 2024-05-08 0:15 ` Isaku Yamahata
9 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Isaku Yamahata @ 2024-05-08 0:15 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Paolo Bonzini
Cc: linux-kernel, kvm, vbabka, isaku.yamahata, xiaoyao.li, binbin.wu,
seanjc, rick.p.edgecombe, michael.roth, yilun.xu
On Tue, May 07, 2024 at 02:07:20PM -0400,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> wrote:
> This is the hopefully final version of the gmem common API patches,
> adding target-independent functionality and hooks that are
> needed by SEV-SNP and TDX.
>
> Changes from https://patchew.org/linux/20240404185034.3184582-1-pbonzini@redhat.com/:
I tried those patches and confirmed that now kvm_gmem_populate() and
private_max_mapping_level() hook work for TDX KVM without further change.
Thank you for updating them.
--
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2024-05-08 0:15 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2024-05-07 18:07 [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 1/9] mm: Introduce AS_INACCESSIBLE for encrypted/confidential memory Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 2/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Use AS_INACCESSIBLE when creating guest_memfd inode Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 3/9] KVM: guest_memfd: pass error up from filemap_grab_folio Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 4/9] KVM: guest_memfd: limit overzealous WARN Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 5/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Add hook for initializing memory Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 6/9] KVM: guest_memfd: extract __kvm_gmem_get_pfn() Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 7/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Add interface for populating gmem pages with user data Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 8/9] KVM: guest_memfd: Add hook for invalidating memory Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:07 ` [PATCH 9/9] KVM: x86: Add hook for determining max NPT mapping level Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-08 0:15 ` [PATCH v2 0/9] KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX Isaku Yamahata
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